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ABSTRACT 
 
Julia Kane: Speaking Up: Is Speaking or Listening Related to Health Care Errors? 
(Under the direction of Linda Beeber) 
 
 
 Communication issues have been recognized as a contributing factor in the majority 
of health care errors. Failure to share critical information or concerns with other health care 
professionals is one type of communication issue, and for years health care professionals 
have been told to “speak up” when they have information or concerns to address this. What is 
meant by “speak up” has not been clear, as it has been defined and operationalized in many 
different ways. A literature review was conducted to explore the meaning of “speak up,” and 
187 articles were evaluated for usage of the term speaking up and related synonyms. A mixed 
methods study was conducted at a large academic medical center, utilizing survey data to 
identify units with high and low levels of speaking up behaviors and then interviews were 
conducted with nurses to explore how they define and operationalize speaking up. This led to 
a description of the phenomenon of speaking up for medical surgical nurses at one hospital. 
Results from the study and the literature review also indicate that most health care 
professionals do speak up when they see an issue, indicating we need to examine issues 
around raising concerns beyond encouraging people to do it. Definitions from the literature 
and from interviews were examined for similarities and differences and a new definition for 
speaking up for patient safety is presented. Recommendations for future research, including 
the need to examine speaking up from the listening side, are discussed. 
iv 
 
To my children, Conlan, Garrett, and Meghan. Thank you for leaving mom alone to think 
and write sometimes and for learning to feed yourselves. I love you all very much. 
 
  
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 Many, many thanks to my committee for staying with me on my long journey to 
completion. Your patience and expertise have been invaluable and greatly appreciated.
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................x 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1 
 
Background ...........................................................................................................1 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................12 
 
Purpose and Methodology ..................................................................................13 
 
PRISMA and Covidence .........................................................................15 
 
The Matrix Method .................................................................................17 
 
Results .................................................................................................................18 
 
Types of Articles .....................................................................................19 
 
Populations and Areas of Interest ...........................................................21 
 
Definitions, Synonyms, and Operationalizations ....................................23 
 
Interventions to Increase Speaking Up Behaviors ..................................36 
 
Instruments Used to Measure Speaking Up Behaviors ...........................46 
 
Discussion ...........................................................................................................49 
 
Article Sources, Types, and Focus ..........................................................50 
 
Populations and Clinical Specialties of Interest ......................................52 
 
Definitions and Operationalizations .......................................................53 
 
Interventions to Increase Speaking Up Behaviors ..................................54 
 
vii 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC)...........................55 
 
Conclusions .........................................................................................................55 
 
III. STUDY METHODS ...........................................................................................57 
 
Phase 1: Quantitative Data for Purposive Sampling ...........................................57 
 
Phase 2: Qualitative Interviewing .......................................................................60 
 
IV. RESULTS ...........................................................................................................66 
 
Participants ..........................................................................................................67 
 
The Phenomenon of Speaking Up ......................................................................68 
 
Role of Nurse ......................................................................................................68 
 
Identifying the Problem ......................................................................................70 
 
Bringing the Problem to Someone Who Can Address It ....................................71 
 
Providing Recommendations ..............................................................................74 
 
Success Versus Failure .......................................................................................75 
 
The Emotions of Speaking Up ............................................................................77 
 
External Influences on Speaking up Behaviors ..................................................80 
 
Defining Speaking Up for Patient Safety ............................................................84 
 
Conclusions .........................................................................................................86 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................88 
 
Defining Speaking Up for Patient Safety ............................................................88 
 
What is Known ...................................................................................................92 
 
Clinical Tools for Speaking Up ..........................................................................93 
 
Measurements of Speaking Up ...........................................................................94 
 
Implications for Practice and Future Research ...................................................94 
 
viii 
Limitations ..........................................................................................................96 
 
APPENDIX A: FIFTEEN MOST FREQUENTLY USED SYNONYMS FOR  
SPEAKING UP ........................................................................................................................99 
 
APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY .........................................100 
 
APPENDIX C: FLYER .........................................................................................................108 
 
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE ..................................................................................109 
 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................111 
  
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 
 1  Literature Review Search Terms .................................................................... 14 
 
 2  Populations Defined ........................................................................................ 22 
 
 3  Definitions of Speaking Up from Articles ...................................................... 24 
 
 4  Definitions of Whistleblowing from Articles ................................................. 26 
 
 5  Other Synonym Definitions from Articles ...................................................... 27 
 
 6  Operationalizations of Speaking Up and Whistleblowing .............................. 31 
 
 7  Interventions Reported .................................................................................... 37 
 
 8  HSOPSC Translations and Modifications ...................................................... 47 
 
 9  Units of Interest for Speaking Up Study—HSOPSC Rankings ..................... 67 
 
 10  Emotions around Speaking Up ....................................................................... 78 
 
 11  Definitions from Interviews ............................................................................ 85 
 
 
  
 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 
 1 PRISMA flowchart for Speaking Up review .................................................. 16 
 2 Articles by country and focus ......................................................................... 20 
 3 Article focus—speaking up, whistleblowing, other ........................................ 21 
 4 Number of articles by population and country ............................................... 23 
 
 
  
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The importance of effective, timely communication to patient safety has been well 
recognized since the publication of To Err is Human in 1999 (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000; Wachter, 2012). One of the commonly discussed ways to improve communication in 
healthcare revolves around the phrase speak up. Patients and healthcare providers are told 
they need to speak up and ask questions if they see something unsafe (Maxfield, Grenny, 
Lavandero, & Groah, 2011; Wachter, 2012). Nurses are told in campaigns like “Silence 
Kills” and in teamwork trainings that they need to speak up if they see something that 
endangers patients (Maxfield et al., 2011; Spruce, 2014). But what is speaking up? Most of 
the discussion around speaking up ends with just telling providers to do it, without clearly 
defining it or providing tools to do so. Silence and ineffective speaking up are even grouped 
together by some studies or treated as the same thing, further clouding what exactly speaking 
up entails (Maxfield et al., 2011). My aim with this dissertation is to conduct a literature 
review of the concept of speaking up and to explore through qualitative inquiry how nurses 
are defining and operationalizing speaking up in the hospital setting, specifically medical-
surgical units. 
Background 
 The publication To Err is Human brought to light the seriousness of errors in 
healthcare (Kohn et al., 2000). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Agency 
 2 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Net defines healthcare error as 
“An act of commission (doing something wrong) or omission (failing to do the right thing) 
that leads to an undesirable outcome or significant potential for such an outcome” (PSNet, 
n.d.a). To Err is Human estimated healthcare errors killed just under 100,000 people each 
year in the United States, a number that would have made healthcare errors the fifth leading 
cause of death in the United States in 1999 (Kohn et al., 2000; Hoyert, Arias, Smith, Murphy, 
& Kochanek, 2001). More recent studies find the number of deaths even higher, with 
reported estimates that errors kill between 100,000 and 400,000 plus patients each year in the 
United States, a number that moves healthcare errors to the third leading cause of death in 
recent years (James, 2013; Makary & Daniel, 2016). There is no recent estimate of morbidity 
from medical error; the Institute of Medicine estimated it to be as many as a million people in 
1999 (Abbasi, 2016). 
The large range of estimates for morbidity and mortality from healthcare errors comes 
primarily from the lack of data. Most error reporting is entirely voluntary. Only half of U.S. 
states have some system of mandated error reporting, but only a small number of events are 
reportable, and even within these systems, underreporting is common (Abbasi, 2016). Since 
2012, The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will not pay for about two 
dozen errors, referred to as “never events” (Galewitz, 2011). Never events are defined by the 
AHRQ as “adverse events that are unambiguous, serious, and usually preventable. While 
most are rare, when never events occur, they are devastating to patients and indicate serious 
underlying organizational safety problems” (PSNet, n.d.c). This change to reimbursement 
rules meant hospitals were forced to track these errors, as mistakes in billings to CMS can 
lead to large fines (CMS, 2016; Galewitz, 2011). But even if hospitals are not billing for the 
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errors it does not mean they are not reporting them, even in states with mandatory reporting. 
In 2012 the Office of Inspector General found that only 14% of errors with Medicare 
beneficiaries was captured by hospital error reporting systems, and of those, less than 1% 
were reported to state systems (Abassi, 2016; Office of Inspector General, 2012). Even the 
Joint Commission (JC), an independent, not for profit organization that accredits over 21,000 
health care organizations and programs in United States, does not mandate reporting of errors 
by its members (Joint Commission, 2016a). The Joint Commission encourages reporting of 
sentinel events, which they define as “A sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence involving 
death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury 
specifically includes loss of limb or function” (Joint Commission, 2013, p. SE-1). Although 
all sentinel events are not errors, and vice versa, a review of sentinel events reported to JC in 
2014 found that errors were the primary cause identified in the majority of cases (Joint 
Commission Online, 2015). So, although data on sentinel events could lead to better statistics 
about patient safety and healthcare errors, reporting is voluntary, and only 764 events were 
reported to JC in 2014 (Joint Commission Online, 2015). With the current estimates of 
patient deaths well into the hundreds of thousands, it is doubtful 764 is the actual total of 
sentinel events in JC hospitals. 
The data we do have come from voluntary reporting, retrospective studies of patient 
files, malpractice case records, and from the mandatory reporting systems that are in place in 
some states and the CMS. But clearly the data are incomplete. Most error reports will never 
be seen by anyone outside of the occurring location’s risk management department, and 
many errors are never reported at all (Classen et al., 2011; Makary & Daniel, 2016). 
Healthcare facilities are not eager to share their errors with the public. The studies and case 
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reports that are published often come from the state mandated error reporting networks, e.g., 
Pennsylvania, or closed malpractice cases (Abbasi, 2016; Blanco, Clarke, & Martindell, 
2009). Some hospitals also participate in voluntary error reporting networks, like the 
National Perinatal Information Center (NPIC), which compiles and analyzes data for its 
member hospitals, including adverse outcomes data (NPIC, n.d.). Although the NPIC 
occasionally publishes articles from the data it collects, the data are not publicly available. 
This is common for collectives and individual hospitals, which makes it difficult to get a 
clear picture of errors. With reporting still mostly voluntary and mandatory reporting only in 
place for certain conditions, underreporting of healthcare issues is clearly an issue. As Robert 
Wachter, MD states, “My own feeling is we don’t really know the number of deaths from 
medical errors. The fact that we are still not able to measure the extent of the problem or 
easily know whether we’re making progress is a problem” (as cited in Abassi, 2016, p. 699). 
The fact that communication plays a large role in medical errors has been widely 
acknowledged (Joint Commission, 2013; Wachter, 2012). Communication refers to all 
exchanges of information that occur, whether verbal or written. This includes face-to-face 
exchanges, telephone conversations, and written and electronic orders. Communication 
failures between healthcare providers are a common contributing factor in a majority of 
medical errors, with multiple studies finding this problem in over 80% of errors reviewed 
(Haig, Sutton, & Whittington, 2006; Nadzam, 2009; Wachter, 2012). Communication is 
consistently among the top three causes of medical errors and is identified as a contributing 
factor in almost all cases (Nadzam, 2009; Wachter, 2012). The JC has had communication in 
the top three of most frequently identified root causes of sentinel events for over 10 years 
(Joint Commission Online, 2015). Examples of communication errors include silence about 
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patient safety issues, miscommunication at handoffs, failure to relay test results to the proper 
provider, and poor documentation (J. L. Classen, 2010; Crico Strategies, 2015; Maxfield et 
al., 2011). A review of over 23,000 malpractice cases from 2009 to 2013 found 
communication was a factor in 30% of the cases, of which 88% resulted in medium to high 
severity injuries, including death (Circo Strategies, 2015). These cases incurred $1.7 billion 
in losses for the healthcare and insurance companies, and 57% of the cases were related to 
provider-to-provider communication (Circo Strategies, 2015). That 57% accounted for 73% 
of the incurred losses, and among nursing cases, 72% related to provider-to-provider 
communication (Circo Strategies, 2015). The top communication error was 
miscommunication about the patient’s condition (Circo Strategies, 2015). Clearly 
communication plays a major role in healthcare errors. The reasons and conditions behind 
communication errors are complex and complicate addressing these issues. 
The Joint Commission has identified improving communication between healthcare 
staff as a patient safety goal again for 2018 (Joint Commission, 2018). Nurses play a key role 
in healthcare communication, as they are often responsible for relaying important 
information about the patient to other healthcare providers and spend the most time at the 
bedside (AHRQ, 2012). Difficulties in communicating between disciplines can be made even 
worse by the differences in training, terminology, and hierarchal issues (Makary et al., 2006; 
Mackintosh & Sandall, 2010; Manojlovich, 2010). Language and terminology differences 
result from the differences in how healthcare professionals are trained. Education in 
healthcare is often siloed, where little to no interaction occurs between the professions during 
training (Dayton & Henriksen, 2007). This makes it common for professionals to have little 
to no understanding of the jobs of those around them, which can lead to hesitancy to 
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challenge the actions of others on the healthcare team (Buckley, Laursen, & Otarola, 2009; 
Dayton & Henriksen, 2007). The perceived difference in knowledge is also often cited as a 
barrier, especially among nurses and junior physicians (Fackler, Chambers, & Bourbonniere, 
2015; Maxfield et al., 2011; Szymczak, 2016). Even in cases where these providers see an 
error occurring or disagree with a plan of care, they will often remain silent if they feel they 
do not have enough expertise to challenge what is occurring (Fackler et al., 2015; Lyndon et 
al., 2012; Maxfield et al., 2011). 
Hierarchy issues also impact interprofessional communication. A nurse or physician’s 
perception of their power in a situation, often related to the hierarchical structure of the 
healthcare system, greatly influences their willingness to voice concerns or give any input at 
all (Fackler et al., 2015; Lyndon et al., 2012; Maxfield et al., 2011; Sutcliffe, Lewton, & 
Rosenthal, 2004). A study found that 12% of obstetric nurses and physicians would not speak 
up about an issue to a perceived superior even if they perceived a high probability of major 
harm coming to the patient (Lyndon et al., 2012). A survey of surgeons found that close to 
50% would not welcome input or correction from a junior member of the operating room 
staff, believing the decisions of the leader should not be questioned (Wachter, 2012). A 
review of 444 surgical malpractice claims found that of those where communication 
breakdown resulted in patient harm, 74% of cases involved status asymmetry between the 
sender and receiver (Greenberg et al., 2007). Clearly the steep hierarchy often found in 
healthcare systems can negatively impact communication and patient safety. 
Disrespectful behavior is also found to impact communication in healthcare. 
Disrespectful treatment of colleagues is found to be common in healthcare; a survey of over 
4,000 nurses found 85% reported working with people who demonstrate disrespect for 
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others, and 46% reported the disrespect interfered with communication (Maxfield et al., 
2011). Lucian Leape and colleagues discussed the widespread culture of disrespect as “a 
substantial barrier to progress in patient safety,” identifying six categories of disrespectful 
behavior (Leape et al., 2012, p. 845). Four of the six categories identified have been shown to 
impact communication between healthcare professionals: disruptive behavior; humiliating, 
demeaning treatment of nurses, residents, and students; passive-aggressive behavior; and 
passive disrespect (Johnson, 2009; Leape et al., 2012; Maxfield et al., 2011; Rosenstein & 
O’Daniel, 2005; Sutcliffe et al., 2004). All of these have been reported to interfere with 
communication, from making the actual process less effective to people avoiding 
communication with disrespectful providers (Johnson, 2009; Leape et al., 2012; Maxfield et 
al., 2011). 
Although multiple barriers to communication in healthcare have been identified, the 
importance of open communication at all levels and among all providers to patient safety has 
also been made clear. Retrospective reviews of errors and near misses indicate the 
importance of any healthcare provider voicing their concern. A near miss is defined as “an 
event or situation that did not produce patient injury, but only because of chance. This good 
fortune might reflect robustness of the patient or a fortuitous, timely intervention” (PSNet, 
n.d.b). An analysis of wrong site surgery near misses and actual occurrences at 97 
Pennsylvania hospitals from August 2007 to August 2008 found a significant difference 
between near misses and errors when a staff member communicated their concern (Blanco et 
al., 2009). In fact, the voicing of concerns by staff members and acknowledgement of those 
concerns accounted for the most significant differences between near misses or errors, with 
the voicing and acknowledgment of concerns leading to more near misses and fewer errors 
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(Blanco et al., 2009). Another study involving interviews with 26 physician residents from a 
variety of specialties found that the most common issue cited for the 70 errors reported was 
communication, with the interviewees expressing that many could have been prevented with 
improved communication (Sutcliffe et al., 2004). This is a common finding in studies looking 
at errors retrospectively; lab results and orders are not communicated properly, information 
about the patient is not shared, and input from all professionals is not valued (Arora, Johnson, 
Lovinger, Humphrey, & Meltzer, 2005; Gawande, Zinner, Studdert, & Brennan, 2003; 
Greenberg et al., 2007; Johnson, 2009; Maxfield et al., 2011; Rothschild et al., 2005; 
Sutcliffe et al., 2004). As one resident put it, 
If I felt like I could actually communicate with that group of attendings I 
would have tried, but I didn't feel like it would useful to me. And all it would 
have done would be to inflame the relations between me and that attending 
and the patient still would have ended up getting [inappropriate treatment]. (as 
cited in Sutcliffe et al., 2004, p. 189) 
 
Nurses also expressed similar feelings and stories: 
We tried to stop the doctor (plastic surgeon) and he said the permit was 
wrong. The patient was already asleep and he proceeded to do the wrong side 
against what the patient had verified, which had matched the permit. We could 
not get any support from the supervisor or anesthesiologist. . . . We felt 
absolutely powerless to being an advocate for the patient. (as cited in 
Maxfield et al., 2011, p. 5) 
 
It is evident in the literature that communication needs to be improved in healthcare, 
including increasing the voicing of concerns and the valuing of input from all professionals. 
One way that is often discussed in the healthcare literature to increase these behaviors is by 
encouraging speaking up. 
Speaking up has become a popular catch phrase in healthcare, especially in relation to 
patient safety. Speaking up is defined in one article as “the raising of concerns by health care 
professionals for the benefit of patient safety and care quality upon recognizing or becoming 
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aware of the risky or deficient actions of others within health care teams in a hospital 
environment” (Okuyama, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2014, p. 1). Speaking up is mentioned in many 
other articles, but no definition or even description of what it entails is offered (Beyea, 2008; 
Lyndon et al., 2012; Maxfield et al., 2011). Most authors discuss the importance of speaking 
up for patient safety without any definition or operationalization of the term. There are data 
which indicate that speaking up behaviors are important and lead to safer care (Blanco et al., 
2009; Sutcliffe et al., 2004). But research reports also vary as to the definition of speaking 
up. The two quotes above illustrate two common scenarios around speaking up in patient 
safety—the resident chose not to speak at all, and the nurses spoke up but were ignored by 
other providers (Maxfield et al., 2011; Sutcliffe et al., 2004). Both were used as examples of 
not speaking up, although clearly the nurses did voice their concerns. 
Equating ineffective speaking up with silence is especially problematic. Silence in the 
work place, or employee silence, is a different concept altogether from speaking up. Defined 
as “the intentional withholding of information by employees from others,” this is the direct 
opposite of the definition of speaking up (Johannesen, as cited in Tangirala & Ramanujam, 
2008, p. 39). Using both silence and ineffective speaking up as examples of a lack of 
speaking up further indicates the confusion surrounding this concept. 
 Some team training programs also contain tools for providers to voice their concerns, 
such as TeamSTEPPS CUS (TeamSTEPPS® 2.0, 2012). CUS, which stands for Concerned, 
Uncomfortable, and Safety, teaches nurses to raise concerns with the person TeamSTEPPS 
refers to as the “decisionmaker,” often physicians, by using three statements in order: “I’m 
concerned, I’m uncomfortable, This is a safety issue”; each one is supposed to indicate to the 
decisionmaker the speaker’s increasing discomfort with the situation (Pocket Guide: 
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TeamSTEPPS, 2014). The use of the word concern is problematic. It is defined as “relate to; 
be about” or “worry; make anxious” when used as a verb (Concern, n.d.) Therefore, when a 
nurse is expressing concern about a decision, she or he is saying the decision makes them 
worried or anxious. This is not the same as indicating they believe the decision is wrong or 
that they disagree. The CUS system also relies on the receiver knowing the importance of the 
use of the words, which requires they have received and retained TeamSTEPPS training. 
Even though team training is widely regarded as important to improving patient safety and 
reducing error, issues remain in terms of implementation and retention, and large numbers of 
healthcare providers have never had any formal team training (Salas & Rosen, 2013; Weller, 
Boyd, & Cumin, 2014). Even those that have completed the training at some point will lose 
the skills if they are not practiced and reinforced (Salas & Rosen, 2013). The goal of this 
dissertation is therefore to look at speaking up as a standalone concept. Investigators have 
reported that speaking up alone can improve patient outcomes and prevent errors (Blanco et 
al., 2009; Sutcliffe et al., 2004). By achieving a better understanding of speaking up, this 
dissertation may also help improve teamwork trainings by clarifying issues around speaking 
up and identifying effective behaviors. 
 Speaking up for patient safety has been shown to improve outcomes for patients, 
turning what could have been fatal errors into near misses (Blanco et al., 2009). But the lack 
of clarity about the definition of speaking up and how to do it, along with issues like 
disrespectful behavior and steep authority gradients, has led to providers who are hesitant to 
do so (Lyndon et al., 2012; Sutcliffe et al., 2004). The available evidence is also unclear as to 
what differentiates speaking up that is effective for making positive change in the patient’s 
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care from speaking up that is ignored. This dissertation will attempt to gain a greater 
understanding of these issues around speaking up. The aims of this dissertation are to: 
1. Understand the definition and operationalization of speaking up by healthcare 
professionals in hospital settings through a comprehensive literature review. 
2. Examine how nurses are defining and operationalizing speaking up in their work. 
3. Explore the situational and environmental factors that affect the speaking up and 
silence behaviors of nurses.  
4. Describe the emotional and psychological impacts on nurses who speak up. 
Clearly understanding and defining a concept is key, and is a necessary, preliminary step to 
ensure any future interventions are appropriate and effective. 
  
 12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A thorough literature review is the first step in addressing any research problem. A 
clear understanding of what is already known on a topic is needed before undertaking 
research in that area. Garrard (2017) defines a literature review as 
an analysis of scientific materials about a specific topic that requires the reviewer to 
carefully read each of the studies to evaluate the study purpose, determine the 
appropriateness and quality of the scientific methods, examine the analysis of the 
questions and answers posed by the authors, summarize the findings across the 
studies, and write an objective synthesis of the findings. (pp. 4–5) 
Other types of reviews, such as integrative, systematic, and meta-analysis, share the basic 
framework of design that a literature review has, but they have different methodology and 
purpose, mostly looking to synthesize the results from multiple intervention studies and offer 
conclusions and recommendations (Garrard, 2017; Moher et al., 2009). The literature review 
used in this project provided a foundation for the empirical investigation. As full 
understanding of the use of the concept of speaking up for patient safety in healthcare was 
the goal, this review included all articles that discussed speaking up for patient safety, even if 
speaking up was not the primary topic of the paper.  
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Purpose and Methodology 
This literature review was conducted utilizing Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines and the Covidence online 
literature review management system (Moher et al., 2009; www.covidence.org). The analysis 
was done utilizing Garrard’s matrix method for health science literature reviews (Garrard, 
2017). The purpose of this review was twofold: first, to examine the language of speaking up 
to gain a clearer picture of how healthcare workers were defining and discussing speaking 
up, and second, to explore how speaking up for patient safety was being operationalized in 
healthcare, including any intervention studies that have been done. In order to present a clear 
and usable description of the concept of speaking up, the limits for this search were much 
broader. Any article that discussed speaking up, or related search terms (Table 1), was 
included. The only limits placed on the search were: written in English language and 
published since 1999. No dissertations/theses were included. The year 1999 was chosen 
because that was the year To Err is Human was published, resulting in increased awareness 
of issues around patient safety and interest in addressing these issues. The year 1999 is often 
used to mark the beginning of the modern patient safety movement (Wachter, 2012).  
 Four different databases were searched, PubMed, CINAHL, PsychoInfo and 
Communication/Mass Media Complete. Table 1 shows all the search terms used, repeated in 
each database. The different terms were selected from prior readings on speaking up and 
discussions with other healthcare professionals. Results were imported into a digital 
reference library (RefWorks) and repeats were removed. This left 1,212 studies to be 
imported into Covidence for screening.  
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Table 1 
Literature Review Search Terms 
 
Source/Search Terms 
Number of Studies 
Found 
PubMed—Limited to 1999-2017, English, humans  
Speak* up and patient safety 115 
Voic* concerns and patient safety 58 
whistleblowing and patient safety 65 
MeSH Term- Patient safety and advoca* 139 
And rais* concerns 71 
And report* concerns 147 
And address* concerns 174 
Communication openness and patient safety 42 
Share views and patient safety 5 
Share concerns and patient safety 56 
Sharing concerns and patient safety 41 
Announc* concerns and patient safety 12 
Confront* and patient safety 136 
Question authority and patient safety 12 
Speak* up and medical error 74 
CINAHL, PsychInfo, Communication and Mass Media 
Complete, 1999-2017, human, English  
Speak* up and patient safety 54 
Voic* concerns and patient safety 10 
whistleblowing and patient safety 17 
Patient safety and advoca* 305 
And rais* concerns 123 
And report* concerns 88 
And address* concerns 68 
Communication openness and patient safety 32 
Share views and patient safety 3 
Share concerns and patient safety 2 
Sharing concerns and patient safety 1 
Announc* concerns and patient safety 0 
Total 1,934, 722 Duplicates- 1,212 to Covidence for Review  
 
 15 
PRISMA and Covidence 
 The 2009 PRISMA guidelines addressed issues with quality in systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses (Moher et al., 2009). The guidelines were a revision of the 1996 Quality 
of Reporting of Meta-analyses, or QUOROM, Statement (Moher et al., 2009). The guidelines 
consist of a 27-item checklist of “items to include when reporting a systematic review or 
meta-analysis” (Moher et al., 2009, p. 266). For this review, the guidelines used were those 
concerning the search and selection of articles for review. The full electronic search strategy 
is presented in Table 1, including any limits, so that others can repeat the search. A PRISMA 
flowchart, indicating how articles were selected for review, was generated for this project as 
well. This allowed for a clear picture of the article selection process, including exclusion and 
inclusion reasons and numbers of articles screened at each level. Figure 1 is the PRISMA 
flowchart.  
 The Covidence online literature review management website was used for this review 
(www.covidence.org). Covidence is an online service that is designed to make the production 
of high-quality literature reviews faster and easier (www.covidence.org/about-us). In 2015 
Cochrane partnered with Covidence to make them the standard production platform for 
Cochrane Reviews (www.covidence.org/about-us). Covidence allows for easy collaboration 
between reviewers and streamlines much of the literature review process. Searches were 
conducted across multiple databases and resulting articles compiled into an Excel 
spreadsheet, which was then imported into Covidence. The articles were then screened at the 
title and abstract level by a minimum of two reviewers.  
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Figure 1. PRISMA flowchart for Speaking Up review.  
 One reviewer had to be the primary author, and the other reviewer could be any of the 
four healthcare and research professionals (three Registered Nurse PhDs and one MD), who 
volunteered to work on this project. The system flags any disagreements in decisions to 
include or exclude and must be reviewed by primary author before moving on. Inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are also posted to the website and can be easily reviewed at any time by 
reviewers. All articles were reviewed for any mention of speaking up for patient safety or any 
of the identified synonyms in Table 1. Some articles used the term speaking up but were 
excluded from this literature review if the phrase was used in relation to non-health related 
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topics such as labor disputes or referred to speaking up by patients or family members. After 
review was completed at the title and abstract levels, the full texts of the remaining articles 
were uploaded into Covidence. Articles were then reviewed at the full text level by two 
reviewers. After this process was complete, the remaining articles were utilized for this 
literature review. Extraction and analysis of the articles was done using Garrard’s Matrix 
Method. 
The Matrix Method 
 Garrard’s Matrix Method is a structured way of organizing a literature review 
(Garrard, 2017). The method is used to approach literature reviews in a systemic and 
organized way, using a folder system composed of four primary folders: paper trail, 
documents, review matrix, and synthesis (Garrard, 2017). The paper trail folder is used to 
document the search of the literature. Garrard (2017) utilizes some of the PRISMA 
guidelines in this step, emphasizing the importance of keeping and sharing a detailed, 
reproducible search history and the flowchart to show exclusion and inclusion decisions 
(Table 1 and Figure 1). This folder also includes notes about the search, including notations 
about meetings with librarians or other experts, keywords, and a chronological record of the 
search. Both the PRISMA guidelines and Garrard emphasize the importance of the literature 
search being reproducible, and the paper trail folder is designed to make it easy for the author 
to summarize and report their search techniques and results (Garrard, 2017; Moher et al., 
2009). For this literature review, my paper trail folder was in the form of Word documents 
with my detailed search history and limits, combined with the article review and selection 
process being completed on Covidence. Covidence tracks the reviewers’ decisions, 
inclusions and exclusions. Covidence also creates the PRISMA flow chart once all decisions 
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are made. The second folder of the Matrix Method is the documents folder and is for storing 
the articles selected for the literature review. The articles for this literature review that 
required full text review were uploaded into Covidence to allow access by all reviewers.  
Garrard’s Review Matrix Folder is where the key part of this method, the matrix, is 
utilized (Garrard, 2017). The review matrix is a table created to facilitate extraction of the 
information needed from the articles to fulfill the purpose of the literature review. Some 
headings are common to all reviews for identification purposes, such as article title, authors, 
and publication year. Other column headings can be tailored to the literature review’s 
purpose. For this review, one such heading was if and how speaking up was defined by the 
author(s). Another heading is how speaking up is operationalized. Columns can be reviewed 
and altered as needed during the review process, but the key is to ensure they reflect the 
purpose of the literature review (Garrard, 2017). A column dealing with the type of 
article/study is also common, along with one evaluating the rigor and value of the article. The 
matrix generated for this review was in the form of a large Excel spreadsheet. The final 
folder for Garrard’s method is the Synthesis Folder, and it is where the written synthesis of 
the review of the literature is kept. For this review, the synthesis focused on how healthcare 
professionals’ speaking up for patient safety was being defined and operationalized, 
exploring differences and similarities between the articles. The synthesis also looks at all the 
language being used as synonyms for speaking up, both through narrative analysis and by 
generating a word cloud, a graphic representation of text frequency (www.wordclouds.com).  
Results 
The search of four databases, PubMed, CINAHL, PsychInfo, and Communication and 
Mass Media Complete, returned 1,934 articles. Table 1 contains the multiple search terms 
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used and the number of articles returned from each term. All articles were imported into 
RefWorks, and then 722 duplicates were removed. The remaining 1,212 articles were 
imported to an Excel spreadsheet and then uploaded to Covidence.org. The articles were then 
reviewed at the title and abstract level by the author and at least one other reviewer. If there 
was any disagreement among reviewers as to whether to include or exclude at this level, the 
article was included for full text review. A total of 841 were excluded at the title and abstract 
level, and 6 more duplicates were found, leaving 359 articles for full text review. The full 
text of these 359 articles was uploaded into Covidence and reviewed by at least two 
reviewers. Any disagreements at this point as to inclusion were discussed and the author 
made the final decision. After full text review, 175 articles were included in the study. 
Another 12 articles were added from reference list reviews, making the final total of articles 
for this literature review 187. Figure 1 is the PRISMA flowchart, including exclusion reasons 
at the full text level.  
Types of Articles  
Articles came primarily from the United States (85 articles) and the United Kingdom 
(44), with Australia (16) and Canada (8) accounting for the most other articles outside of 
those two countries, with 34 articles coming from a variety of other countries (Figure 2). 
Articles were evaluated for focus, defined here as what the primary topic of the article was. 
This was decided by evaluating the title, abstract, aim, and/or content of the article. A total of 
103 articles had a focus other than speaking up, and 84 were focused on speaking up or 
whistleblowing (Figure 3). Of the 187 articles, 110 can be broadly classified as studies. This 
includes qualitative, quantitative, case, or mixed methods studies, retrospective reviews, and 
quality improvement projects. The remaining 77 articles are broadly classified as non-
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studies, and included opinion pieces, topic review/recommendation articles, continuing 
education texts, literature reviews, theory articles, and news reports. Of the 110 study 
articles, 26 were intervention studies. Two articles were about the same intervention, so 25 
total interventions were reported. Within the 25 interventions, only 16 were related to 
increasing speaking up behaviors. Of those 16 studies, only 10 had increasing speaking up as 
a study aim; no studies looked to increase whistleblowing. 
 
Figure 2. Articles by country and focus. 
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Figure 3. Article focus—speaking up, whistleblowing, other. 
Populations and Areas of Interest 
Because of the wide variety of article types in this literature review, population is 
defined in two ways, either the study population or the targeted audience. If an article was a 
study of any sort the population is the study population, i.e. those that completed the 
intervention or survey. In articles that were not studies, the population was defined as the 
targeted audience, based on article title and content or journal. For analysis purposes, discrete 
populations were grouped into larger categories, which are defined in Table 2. The largest 
population was All, with studies that included the entire unit of interest’s population or the 
audience was all healthcare professionals. The second most common was nurses, followed by 
nurses and providers, providers, and students. The majority of articles were not aimed at a 
specific area of the hospital or healthcare, with 113 articles classified as dealing with all 
areas. The next most common area of interest was perioperative, with 32 articles focused on 
operating rooms and the pre- and post-operative areas. All other areas had fewer than ten 
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articles focused on them, with obstetrics and critical care having the most (8 and 6, 
respectively).  
Table 2 
Populations Defined 
Population Definition 
ALL (77 articles) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For study articles this means the study population included 
all members of the unit or hospital of interest. For example, 
in studies completed in the OR this would include surgeons, 
anesthesia providers, nurses, scrub techs, and any perfusion 
technologists or other specialists. 
 
For non-study articles this would include articles aimed at 
healthcare professionals in general, such opinion articles 
published in the Joint Commission Journal on Quality and 
Patient Safety. 
NURSES (58 articles) 
 
 
Any study article with nurses as the population or non-study 
article with nurses as the intended audience as indicated by 
article title and content or journal. 
NURSES & PROVIDERS 
(14 articles) 
 
 
 
 
Any study article with nurses and providers as the population 
or non-study article with nurses and providers as the 
intended audience as indicated by article title and content or 
journal. Providers include physicians and mid-level 
providers such as nurse practitioners and physician’s 
assistants.  
PROVIDERS (21 articles) 
 
 
 
 
Any study article with providers as the population or non-
study article with providers as the intended audience as 
indicated by article title and content or journal. Providers 
include physicians and mid-level providers such as nurse 
practitioners and physician’s assistants. 
STUDENTS (17 articles) 
 
 
Any study or non-study article with students as the 
population of interest. Students include all healthcare 
professions’ students. 
 
A majority of articles were aimed at all health professionals (Figure 4). Nurses were 
always a part of the all population; there were no studies done hospital wide that excluded 
nurses, and non-study articles that discussed health care in general included nursing in these 
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discussions. Almost half (44%) of the non-study articles had all as their intended audience, 
and another 39% were aimed at nurses specifically. The majority (76%) of studies included 
nurses in the study population. This literature review did not specifically target nurses and 
“nurse” was not used as a search term (Table 1). Though CINAHL (the nursing literature 
database) was one of the four databases, the other three databases were not nursing specific. 
 
Figure 4. Number of articles by population and country. Australia, Canada, Other Countries, 
UK, and USA for each population (group). Color shows details about Australia, Canada, 
other countries, UK, and USA. 
Definitions, Synonyms, and Operationalizations 
Fifteen articles provided definitions of speaking up (Table 3). There was overlap in 
definitions used, so a total of 11 definitions were found. Eighteen articles provided 
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definitions for whistleblowing, with a total of 14 definitions identified (Table 4). Some 
authors offered definitions for synonyms of speaking up, eight of which are presented in 
Table 5. All synonyms used by authors were collected in the synonyms column of the matrix 
and then imported into a word cloud generator (www.wordart.com). In order to clearly show 
the use of terms all tenses and uses were changed to current singular. For example, raising a 
concern, raising concerns, and a concern was raised, were all changed to raise concern. The 
word cloud is presented in Appendix A. “Speak up” was used twice as often as the next most 
common term, “raise concern.” The top 15 terms with their frequency are listed in Appendix 
A, along with the word cloud. 
Table 3 
Definitions of Speaking Up from Articles 
Article Definition 
Dayton & Henriksen, 2007, p. 35 
No reference 
Speak up (that is, initiate a message) to draw 
attention to the situation before harm is caused. 
Eichhorn 2013, p. 114 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
 
Speaking up to power—preventing a situation where 
one member of a perioperative team recognizes a 
clear and present danger or a potential danger to 
patient but is inhibited from calling attention to the 
danger because of a sociocultural inequality, 
intimidation, fear of reprisal (such as job loss), or 
simply being ignored. 
Fagan, Parker, & Jackson 2016, p. 2346 
 
 
No reference 
Assertive communication in clinical situations that 
requires immediate action through questions, 
statements of opinion or information with 
appropriate persistence aiming for resolution. 
Law & Chan, 2015, p. 1838 
 
Attributed to Sayre et al., 2012 
An individual using his/her voice to convey to 
someone in higher authority specific information that 
might make a difference to patient safety. 
Martinez et al., 2015, p. 672 
 
 
 
Stating concerns (e.g., filing a report, sharing 
concerns with a supervisor or speaking directly with 
the individual(s) involved) rather than saying 
nothing. 
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Table 3 
Cont. 
Article Definition 
Nembhard, Labao, & Savage, 2015, p. 226 
 
Attributes Morrison, 2011 
 
Also Voice—Discretionary communication of ideas, 
suggestions, concerns, or opinions about work-
related issues with the intent to improve 
organizational or unit functioning 
Okuyama et al., 2014, p. 1 
Eppich 2015, p. 84 
 
Eppich attributes to Okuyama et al., 2014 
Okuyama et al., 2014 attributes to Leonard, Graham, 
& Bonacum, 2004 and Lyndon et al., 2012. 
The raising of concerns by healthcare professionals 
for the benefit of patient safety and care quality upon 
recognizing or becoming aware of the risky or 
deficient actions of others within healthcare teams in 
a hospital environment 
 
Raemer, Kolbe, Minehart, Rudolph, & Pian-Smith, 
2016, p. 530 
Attributed to Okuyama et al., 2014 
 To raise concerns about risky or inappropriate 
actions of other team members 
 
Sayre 2012a, p. 458 
Attributed to a “working paper” by Detert and 
Edmondson, 2005. 
Using one's voice to make known to someone-with 
positional power or authority to take action-specific 
information or knowledge that is privately held. 
Sayre 2012b, p. 1 
 
Attributed to a “working paper” by Detert and 
Edmondson, 2006.  
 
(dates different in two Sayre publications) 
Using voice to make specific information that is 
privately held know to someone- with positional 
power or authority—to take action. 
 
 
 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c 
Schwappach 2015 
Szymczak 2016 
 
Schwappach attributes to Premeaux & Bedian, 2003 
and Lyndon et al., 2012. 
 
Szymczak attributes to Schwappach & Gehring, 
2014c 
Assertive communication in clinical situations that 
require (immediate) action through questions or 
statements of opinion or information with 
appropriate persistence until there is a clear 
resolution to prevent error or harm from reaching the 
patient. 
 
 
 
 
Ahern & McDonald, 2002, p. 305 
Jackson et al., 2010, p. 34 
Kelly & Jones, 2013, p. 183 
Andrew & Mansour, 2014, p. 312 
Andrew & Mansour (2014) and Jackson et al. 
(2010), attribute to Ahern & McDonald, 2002 
Kelly & Jones (2013) attribute to McDonald & 
Ahern, 2000, p. 314 
A nurse who identifies an incompetent, unethical or 
illegal situation in the workplace and reports it to 
someone who may have the power to stop the wrong. 
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Table 4 
Definitions of Whistleblowing from Articles 
Article Definition 
Bolsin, Faunce, & Oakley, 2005, p. 613 
Black, 2011, p. 27 
Black (2011) attributes to Bolsin et al., 2005 
 
 
The attempt, in good faith and in the public interest, 
to disclose and resolve in a reasonable and non-
vexatious manner, but in the face of significant 
institutional or professional opposition, a significant 
deficiency in the quality or safety of health care.  
Bolsin, Pal, Wilmshurst, & Pena, 2011, p. 278 
Kelly & Jones, 2013, p. 182 
Kelly & Jones attribute to Bolsin et al., 2011 
 A whistleblower is defined as a person raises 
concern about wrongdoing. 
 
Duffy, McCallum, Ness, & Price, 2012, p. 177 escalating concerns 
Firtko & Jackson, 2005, p. 2 
 
 
The reporting of information to an individual, group, 
or body that is not part of an organization’s usual 
problem-solving strategy. 
Jackson et al., 2014, p. 240 
Attributed to Near & Miceli, 1985 
 
 
A process whereby a current or former member of an 
organization discloses practices believe to be illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate, to those who may be able to 
effect change. 
Johnstone, 2004, p. 15 
Attributed to Boatright, 1993, p. 133 
 
 
 
 
 
The voluntary release of non-public information, as a 
moral protest, by a member or a former member of 
an organization outside the normal channels of 
communication to an appropriate audience about 
illegal or immoral conduct in the organization or 
conduct in the organization that is opposed in some 
significant way to the public interest. 
Kelly & Jones, 2013, p. 183 
Jones & Kelly, 2014a, p. 710 
Jones & Kelly attributed to Miceli & Near, 1984, p. 
689; Kelly & Jones attributed to Miceli & Near, 
2002, p. 689 
Disclosure by organization members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action. 
 
Jones & Kelly, 2014b, p. 987 
Attributed to Lewis, 2006 
 
Internal or external disclosure by employees (and 
former employees) of malpractice, illegal acts, or 
omissions at work. 
Jones, 2015, p. 67 
Attributed to Bolsin et al., 2011 
A person who raises concern about a perceived 
wrongdoing (interchangeable with raises concerns). 
Mansbach & Bachner, 2010, p. 483 
Attributed to James (1980) and Ray (2006). 
 
 
 
 
The disclosure by a staff member of an organization 
of practices and/or policies engaged in by that 
organization or its employees that wrong or harm a 
third party. The objective of the disclosure is to stop 
the harmful behavior and to prevent such conduct in 
the future. 
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Table 4 
Cont. 
Article Definition 
Mansbach, Melzer, & Bachner, 2012, p. 307 
Attributed to Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008, p. 8 
 
 
 
 
The disclosure by organization members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action. The 
objective of the disclosure is to stop the harmful 
behavior and to prevent such conduct in the future. 
McCutcheon, 2015, p. 125 
 
 
 
When an employee or former employee raises 
concerns regarding a misconduct issue in the 
workplace. Officially it is known as ‘making a 
disclosure in the public interest.’ 
Rodulson, Marshall, & Bleakley, 2015, p. 3 
Attributed to The British Medical Association 
website accessed in 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Where an employee, former employee or member of 
an organisation raises concerns to people who have 
the power and presumed willingness to take 
corrective action. In most cases, the individual is 
unable or unwilling to raise their concerns locally 
either through concern for their own role or because 
they have raised the concern previously and no 
action was taken. 
 
Table 5 
Other Synonym Definitions from Articles 
Article Definition 
Lockett et al., 2015, p. 561 
 
 
 
Peer to peer accountability is a process of 
“speaking up” when one observes a peer doing 
something not according to acceptable practice or 
standards. 
Lyndon, 2008, p. 13 
Attributed to Preston, 2003 
Assertive communication—stating concerns with 
persistence until there is a clear resolution. 
Lyndon & Kennedy, 2010, pp. 24–25 
(1) attributed to Thomas, Sexton & Helmreich, 2004, 
p. i59, (2) to Preston, 2003 
 
 
 
Assertive communication—(1) an individual 
provider asserts their opinion (through questions or 
statements of opinion) during critical times OR (2) 
individuals speak up and state their information with 
appropriate persistence until there is a clear 
resolution. 
Lyndon et al., 2012, p. 2 
Attributed to Simpson & Knox, 2003; Leonard et al., 
2004; Preston, 2003 
Assertive communication—speaking up and stating 
concerns with persistence until these is a clear 
resolution 
Morrow, Gustavson, & Jones, 2016, p. 43 
 
 
Safety voice—employee willingness to proactively 
participate in communication related behaviors for 
the purpose of improving workplace safety 
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Table 5 
Cont. 
Article Definition 
Patterson, Pace, & Fincham, 2013, p. 132 
HSOPSC study- Not how HSOPSC defines CO. 
 
Communication Openness—characterized by a 
freedom to disclose errors among colleagues within a 
less punitive environment 
Pian-Smith et al., 2009, p. 85 
Collaborative inquiry attributed to Argyris, Putnam, 
& Smith, 1985; Friedman, 2001; Torbert, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative Inquiry combined with Advocacy 
Collaborative inquiry—public testing of 
conclusions and reasoning, inquiry into alternative 
points of view, and seeking to enhance free and 
informed choice. 
Advocacy—a statement that describes the trainee’s 
opinion or position 
Volp, 2006, p. 4 
Attributed to Brower, 1982, p. 141 
 
Advocacy—one who defends, pleads the cause of or 
promotes the rights of, or attempts to change systems 
on behalf of an individual or group 
 
A majority of definitions shared a common theme of calling attention to a patient 
safety issue that needed immediate or prompt attention. The definitions varied in terms of 
who the intended audience of the speaking up is and the focus of speaking up. Okuyama et 
al. (2014) included a phrase in their definition about speaking up “upon recognizing or 
becoming aware of the risky or deficient actions of others” and also limited the location to 
“within healthcare teams in a hospital environment” (p. 1). This specificity contrasts with 
Martinez et al. (2015), whose broader definition of speaking up as “stating concerns (e.g., 
filing a report, sharing concerns with a supervisor or speaking directly with the individual(s) 
involved) rather than saying nothing” (p. 672). Okuyama et al. (2014) definition has very 
clear conditions in terms of not only when an issue should be raised (“upon recognizing or 
becoming aware”), but also what type of issue (“the risky or deficient actions of others”), and 
the location for speaking up (“within healthcare teams in a hospital environment”), whereas 
Martinez et al. (2015) have no limitations on time, type, or location (p. 1). Speaking up can 
be both broadly and narrowly defined; however, as the majority of articles offer no definition 
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of speaking up, it is left to the reader to define the meaning. The term “whistleblowing” has 
similar limitations in the literature, as some of these definitions vary as to detail about how 
the concerns are raised. Johnstone (2004) offers an extremely detailed definition of 
whistleblowing, including that it is a “release of non-public information, as a moral protest,” 
that is done “outside the normal channels of communication” about “illegal or immoral 
conduct” or conduct that is “opposed in some significant way to the public interest” by “a 
member or former member of an organization” (p. 15). In contrast, Bolsin et al. (2011) define 
a whistleblower as “a person who raises concern about wrongdoing” (p. 278). 
Whistleblowing is also defined as both internal and external in terms of organization, with 
internal referring “reporting wrongdoing to an authority within the organization” and external 
reporting “to an outside agency, such as the police, a professional organization, or the press” 
(Mansbach & Bachner, 2010, p. 484). This the clearest difference between definitions of 
speaking up and whistleblowing, as speaking up is never explicitly situated externally.  
Due to the wide variety of types of articles and language used around speaking up, 
operationalizations of speaking up and whistleblowing were challenging to pull from the 
literature. For this paper, operationalization was defined as “the process by which a 
researcher defines how a concept is measured, observed, or manipulated within a particular 
study. This process translates the theoretical, conceptual variable of interest into a set of 
specific operations or procedures that define the variable’s meaning in a specific study” 
(Operationalization, n.d., para. 1). Very few articles explicitly stated operationalizations, 
even those exploring speaking up as a behavior. If an operationalization was not explicitly 
stated, the article was reviewed for less clearly indicated operationalizations, such as 
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instrument wordings and suggested speaking up tools. Table 6 reviews the 
operationalizations found in the articles.  
Twenty-two operationalizations were pulled from the articles; 19 were 
operationalizations of speaking up and three of whistleblowing (Table 6). The 
operationalizations fell primarily under measured perceptions of speaking up and 
whistleblowing or were tools to increase speaking up behaviors. Seven of the 
operationalizations were survey items that measured perceptions of willingness to speaking 
up or blow the whistle (Bowman, Neeman, & Sehgal, 2013; Dendle et al., 2013; Doyle, 
VanDenKerkhof, Edge, Ginsburg, & Goldstein, 2015; Hughes et al., 2014; Mansbach & 
Bachner, 2010; Putnam et al., 2015; Raemer et al., 2016; Reader, Flin, Mearns, & 
Cuthbertson, 2007). For example, Dendle et al. (2013) surveyed physicians about their 
“willingness to prompt” other doctors to perform hand hygiene, using the terms to “ask” or 
“remind” (pp. 72–73). Responses were then reported in the article as “Willingness of medical 
staff to ‘speak up’ if a doctor does not perform HH (hand hygiene)” (Dendle et al., 2013, p. 
73). Of the remaining 14 operationalizations, eight were tools for speaking up. The CUS (I 
am Concerned, I am Uncomfortable, This is a Safety issue) tool was the most commonly 
referenced, though Gould (2010) changed the S to an E for ‘escalate.’ Only Johnson and 
Kimsey (2012) reported actually teaching CUS. The other articles referred to the CUS tool as 
a recommendation or possible intervention (Eppich, 2015; Gould, 2010; Leonard et al., 
2004). The Situation Background Assessment Recommendation (SBAR) tool was discussed 
but not used as an intervention (Eppich, 2015; Leonard et al., 2004; Lyndon & Kennedy, 
2010; Mackintosh & Sandall, 2010). Only Johnson and Kimsey (2012) discussed actually 
teaching providers to use the tools (CUS, two-challenge rule, and ‘stop the line’ were all 
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reported to be taught in their intervention) and provided outcomes related to their use. The 
one written speaking up tool, Hospital Event Analysis Describing Significant Unanticipated 
Problems (HEADS-UP), was described but no data about its use was available (Pannick et 
al., 2015). The other tools discussed were mentioned as recommendations or suggestions for 
interventions (Table 6). 
Table 6 
Operationalizations of Speaking Up and Whistleblowing 
Operationalization Article(s) Category for this Review 
Speaking Up 
“The student was considered to have 
spoken up if she or he refused to cut the 
tissue, clearly stating that a burn is 
needed before a cut; or if the student 
refused to cut the tissue and asked the 
surgeon about the need to burn before 
cutting” (p. 1004). 
Barzallo et al., 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
“A member of the surgical team raised a 
specific concern about possible wrong 
site surgery at any point before incision” 
(p. 218). 
Blanco et al., 2009 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
 
 
Utilizing HSOPSC. Communication 
Openness composite defined as “staff 
freely speak up if they see something 
that may negatively affect a patient and 
feel free to question those with more 
authority” (Sorra et al., 2016, p. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Bowman et al., 2013 
Bump et al., 2015 
Burstrom, L., Letterstal, A., 
Engstrom, M. L., Berglund, A., 
& Enlund, 2014 
El-Jardali, Sheikh, Garcia, 
Jamal, & Abdo, 2014 
Fan et al., 2016 
Khater, Akhu-Zaheya, Al-
Mahasneh, & Khater, 2015 
Mayer et al., 2011 
Mazur et al., 2015 
Nie et al., 2013 
Patterson et al., 2013
Measuring perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three Color Flag System of Speaking 
Up Behaviors 
Table 1, p. 183 
Though examples of best responses are 
given, not a broad operationalization 
Craig & Banja, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
 
Survey, perceived willingness to ask 
colleagues to perform hand hygiene. 
Dendle et al., 2013 
 
Measuring perceptions 
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Table 6 
Cont. 
Operationalization Article(s) Category for this Review 
Speaking Up (cont.) 
Utilizing H-PEPSS. Dimension of four 
items titled “comfort when speaking up” 
(Doyle et al., 2015, p. 139, Table 3)   
Kent, Anderson, Ciocca, Shanks, & 
Enlow (2014) omitted two of the four 
items for their study. 
Doyle et al., 2015 
Kent et al., 2014 
Lukewich et al., 2015 
 
 
 
Measuring perceptions  
 
 
 
 
 
Interview study—Ease of speaking up 
coded on 1-3 scale (Table II, p. 1431). 
3. Open reciprocal communication, 2. 
Respectful but guarded communication, 
1. Communication that is quite limited, 
with some members extremely hesitate 
to speak up. 
Edmondson, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
P.A.C.E. model of graded verbal 
assertiveness. Probe, Alert, Challenge, 
Emergency (p. 114). Attributed to the 
commercial aviation industry. 
Eichhorn, 2013 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
SBAR- Situation, Background, 
Assessment, and Recommendation  
(Eppich, 2015, p. 87) 
Leonard et al. (2004) recommend 
combining SBAR with assertive 
communication. 
Eppich, 2015 
Leonard et al., 2004 
Lyndon & Kennedy, 2010 
Mackintosh & Sandall, 2010 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
 
 
CUS-  
I am Concerned! 
I am Uncomfortable! 
This is a Safety issue! 
 (Eppich, 2015, p. 87) 
Gould (2010) changed S to E for 
Escalate.  
Eppich, 2015 
Gould, 2010 
Johnson & Kimsey, 2012 
Leonard et al., 2004 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modified Human Factors Attitude 
Survey (HFAS) item “Staff will freely 
speak up if they see something that can 
negatively affect patient care”, higher 
score used to indicate willingness to 
speak up (Hughes et al., 2014). 
Hughes et al., 2014 Measuring perceptions 
The two-challenge rule. Johnson and 
Kimsey (2012) describe it as the first 
two assertions of CUS (p. 600). 
Pian-Smith et al. (2012) use aviation two 
challenge rule, challenge twice and then 
modified the third step of taking control 
of the aircraft to getting additional help. 
Johnson & Kimsey, 2012 
Pian-Smith et al., 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
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Table 6 
Cont. 
Operationalization Article(s) Category for this Review 
Speaking Up (cont.) 
Stop the Line 
Johnson & Kimsey (2012) describe this 
as the third assertion of CUS (p. 600). 
Johnson & Kimsey, 2012 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
Assertion Model for speaking up- 
referred to as part of a CRM programme. 
1. Get person’s attention   
2. Express concern 
3. State problem 
4. Propose action 
5. Reach decision (Escalation by 
jumping rank if necessary)  
Law & Chan, 2015, p. 1839, Table 1 
In circular form, this is referred to as the 
Assertion cycle by Leonard et al., 2004. 
Law & Chan, 2015 
Leonard et al., 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likelihood of Speaking Up Index. 
Clinical scenarios with questions-how 
likely are you to insist, step in, take 
additional action? (Lyndon et al., 2012, 
p. 4 Box 1) 
Lyndon et al., 2012 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
 
 
 
Hospital Event Analysis Describing 
Significant Unanticipated Problems 
(HEADS-UP) Briefing and form 
completed every 24 hours to collect and 
address staff concerns (Pannick et al., 
2015). 
Pannick et al., 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Tools for speaking up 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, speaking 
up domain composed of six questions 
(Putnam et al., 2015). 
Putnam et al., 2015 
 
 
Measuring perceptions 
 
 
Desired speaking up actions during 
simulation- For each situation 
Ask/question, then express safety 
concern, followed by taking over or 
getting help (Raemer et al., 2016, p. 532 
Table 1). 
Raemer et al., 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
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Speaking Up (cont.) 
Local survey, two scales dealing with 
speaking up—“Communication 
openness between nurses and doctors” 
and Communication openness within 
groups” defined as “the extent to which 
ICU nurses and doctors/ team members 
within a group (e.g., between doctors) 
can speak openly with one another 
without fear of negative repercussions or 
misunderstanding” (Reader et al., 2007, 
p. 349, Table 2). 
Reader et al., 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whistleblowing 
Conditions for it to be Whistleblowing- 
 An individual performs an 
(unauthorized) action or series of 
actions intended to make information 
public 
 the information is made a matter of 
public record 
 the information is about possible or 
actual, non-trivial wrongdoing in an 
organization 
 the individual who performs the action 
is a member or former member of the 
organization  
Also, usually made to someone with the 
power to either make change or exert 
pressure on those with that power. 
(Johnstone, 2004, p. 15). 
Johnstone, 2004 
Attributed to Vinten, 1994, pp. 
256-257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of whistleblowing: 
Discovery—the wrongdoing is observed 
Evaluation—the wrongdoing is 
evaluated as wrong or illegal 
 Decision—to report the wrongdoing, or 
not. Reaction to the whistleblowing 
Evaluation of the reaction 
(Kelly & Jones, 2013, p. 184). 
Kelly & Jones, 2013 
Attributed to Bjorkelo et al., 
2011 
Criteria for evaluating 
behavior 
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Whistleblowing (cont.) 
For the survey, internal whistleblowing 
was chosen if they decided to “talk to 
your colleague and try to persuade” her 
to admit her deception, or “go to 
someone at the center who has the 
power to intervene” and external 
whistleblowing was chosen if they chose 
to “turn to the Nurses’ Association, an 
external body” or “the media” (p. 486). 
1 to 4 scale of likelihood used. 
Mansbach et al. (2011) same categories 
just with physical therapists (p. 309). 
Mansbach & Bachner, 2010 
Mansbach et al., 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The remaining articles operationalized speaking up or whistleblowing in order to 
evaluate whether or not it was done, categorized as criteria for evaluating behavior in Table 
6. As an example, Blanco et al. (2009), in their retrospective review of operating room errors 
and near misses gave credit for speaking up if “A member of the surgical team raised a 
specific concern about possible wrong site surgery at any point before incision” (p. 218). In 
contrast, study participants in Barzello-Salazar et al. (2014) “were considered to have spoken 
up if they questioned the instruction and did not cut” (p. 1001). Barzello-Salazar et al. (2014) 
required action beyond speech for the participant to have spoken up; Blanco et al. (2009) 
only required the speech act itself. Of the seven articles that operationalized speaking up or 
whistleblowing in order to evaluate whether or not it was done, four counted the speech act 
itself (Blanco et al., 2009; Edmondson, 2003; Johnstone, 2004; Kelly & Jones, 2013), and 
three required an action beyond speech (Barzello-Salazar et al., 2014; Lyndon et al., 2012; 
Raemer et al., 2016). 
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Interventions to Increase Speaking Up Behaviors 
Although 26 intervention studies were found in this literature review, only 16 of the 
interventions were even peripherally related to increasing speaking up behaviors. The other 
ten were interventions that were not aimed at speaking up behaviors (e.g., Burstrom et al.’s 
(2014) study on changing the order of triage in EDs in Sweden). Table 7 lists the 16 
interventions related to speaking up behaviors, along with population, outcomes measured, 
type of intervention, and results. This includes studies that did not have increasing speaking 
up behaviors as an aim or that spent little time discussing speaking up. Only ten studies 
clearly had increasing speaking up behaviors as an aim of their intervention (see Table 7 
note). Of outcomes reviewed, only seven studies of the 16 studies had outcomes related to 
patient safety directly; the majority looked at perceptions or responses in a simulated 
environment. Of those seven, five were not testing an intervention aimed at speaking up 
behaviors; only two studies examined speaking up behavior interventions and actual patient 
safety indicators for outcomes (Johnson & Kimsey, 2012; Pannick et al., 2015).  
Only one intervention study specifically aimed to increase speaking up behaviors had 
practicing nurses as the study population (Sayre et al., 2012a, 2012b). Of the remaining nine 
studies, one sampled nursing students, four involved physicians and/or medical students, 
three involved all unit providers in mental health, perioperative, and medical-surgical units, 
and the remaining study used a variety of healthcare students. (Ashton, 2014; Barzallo-
Salazar et al., 2014; Delisle, Grymonpre, Whitley, & Wirtzfeld, 2016; Johnson & Kimsey, 
2012; Kent et al., 2014; O’Connor, Byrne, O’Dea, McVeigh, & Kerin, 2013; Pannick et al., 
2015; Pian-Smith et al., 2009; Raemer et al., 2016). Including the three studies aimed at 
hospital units as a whole as intervention studies for nurses brings the total number of  
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Authors & Date Study Aim Intervention Population Outcomes Measured Results 
* Ashton, S. 2014. 
Leadership walkrounds 
in mental health care. 
Nursing Times, 
110(23), pp. 21-23. 
 
 
 
 
 
QI report- Patient 
safety walkrounds 
enable staff to raise 
concerns with senior 
executives. Their use 
in one mental health 
trust led to 
improvements in 
safety and care. 
 
The “executive team” 
conducts scheduled unit 
walkrounds two times a 
month, allowing “staff to 
raise concerns with senior 
executives before 
incidents occur” (p.21) 
LEADERSHIP 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
Inpatient mental health 
unit staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unclear. The article 
mentions improvements, 
but no expected 
outcomes are listed 
beyond allowing 
concerns to be raised 
and demonstrating 
visible commitment to 
safety issues. 
 
Reports completion of 
90% of identified 
“actions”, some 
examples give on p. 
22. Unclear how 
measured for many, 
like “physical 
healthcare for 
inpatients has been 
improved” (p. 22). 
* Barzallo-Salazar et al. 
2014. Influence of 
surgeon behavior on 
trainee willingness to 
speak up: a randomized 
controlled trial. Journal 
of the American 
College of Surgery, 
219(5), pp. 1001-1007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To determine if 
surgeon's behaviors 
can encourage or 
discourage trainees 
from speaking up 
when they witness a 
surgical mistake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medical students were 
randomized to either an 
“encouraged” or 
“discouraged” group 
assisting in a simulated 
surgical case. The surgeon 
proceeded to give an 
incorrect instruction to cut 
during the simulation. 
Students were judged to 
have spoken up “if they 
questioned the instruction 
and did not cut” (p. 1001). 
ENCOURAGEMENT & 
SIMULATION 
55 medical students  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether or not the 
student spoke up. They 
also measured 
personality bias with 
two validated 
personality tests before 
simulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82% of the encouraged 
group spoke up versus 
30% of the discouraged 
group. No significant 
difference between 
groups in personality 
traits, training level or 
sex. 
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* Delisle et al. (2016). 
Crucial conversations: 
an interprofessional 
learning opportunity for 
senior healthcare 
students. Journal of 
Interprofessional Care, 
30(6), pp. 777-786. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine the effect 
of interprofessional 
communication 
training, namely 
Crucial 
Conversations, on pre-
licensure healthcare 
students with the goal 
of improving their 
ability to speak up and 
collaborate 
interprofessionally to 
improve patient 
safety. 
Optional extracurricular 
course offered to senior 
students at the schools of 
medicine, nursing, 
dentistry, pharmacy, 
dental hygiene, and 
medical rehabilitation at 
the University of 
Manitoba. Nine 2-hour 
lessons designed by 
VitalSmarts, called 
Crucial Conversations. 
EDUCATION 
 
Thirty-eight senior 
Healthcare students 
(none from dental 
hygiene), in two 
separate cohorts met 
for four weeks for four 
hours each class.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of West 
England 
Interprofessional 
Questionnaire (UWE 
IPQ) measuring 
attitudes towards 
learning, relationships, 
interactions, and 
teamwork used as a pre 
and posttest. 
VitalSmarts survey 
completed 3 to 4 months 
after course. 
 
Baseline scores were 
positive for three 
dimensions and 
remained so in the post 
survey, with some 
improvement. 
Interprofessional 
interaction scores were 
negative at baseline 
and remained so on the 
post survey, no 
improvement. 
 
 
Donnelly, L., 
Dickerson, J., 
Goodfriend, M., 
Muething, S. (2010). 
Improving patient 
safety in radiology: 
concepts for a 
comprehensive patient 
safety program. 
Seminars in 
Ultrasound, CT and 
MRI 31, pp. 67–70. 
 
 
 
To describe the 
horizontal 
interventions to 
improve patient safety 
used in our 
department 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Key Drivers 
1. Error prevention 
training 
2. Cause-analysis program 
3. tactical interventions for 
high-risk areas 
4. lessons-learned program 
5. restructuring of patient 
safety governance (p. 67). 
Focus on creating a culture 
where everyone is 
expected and encouraged 
to speak up (p. 68). 
EDUCATION & 
PROTOCOLS 
Radiology department 
staff at a US 
Children’s hospital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean days between 
serious safety events 
(SSE) and safety culture 
as evaluated by AHRQ 
survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSE at baseline every 
200 days to every 839 
days 2 years later. 
Forty-three percent of 
scores on safety culture 
survey showed 
statistically significant 
improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
Table 7 
Cont. 
Authors & Date Study Aim Intervention Population Outcomes Measured Results 
Hughes et al. (2014). A 
crew resource 
management program 
tailored to trauma 
resuscitation improves 
team behavior and 
communication. J AM 
Coll Surg 219(3), pp. 
545–551. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To evaluate the 
effectiveness of a 
team-building process 
in resuscitation of 
trauma patients, does 
crew resource 
management (CRM) 
modified for trauma 
improve teamwork 
and communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Trauma Resuscitation 
Area (TRA) specific 3- 
hour CRM course was 
required to be completed 
by any staff member who 
participated in trauma 
resuscitations. 
EDUCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 staff members 
who participate in 
trauma resuscitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observation and 
evaluation by 
Communication and 
Teamwork Skills 
(CATS) scoring of 
trauma resuscitations 
pre and post 
intervention. Modified 
Human Factors 
Attitudes Survey 
(HFAS) pre and post. 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant 
improvement in about 
half of the CATS 
metrics; no sig. 
improvement in critical 
language, verbal 
assertion, escalation of 
asserted concern, 
receptive to 
suggestion/ideas. 
Decrease in requesting 
team input (NS). 
HFAS scores increase 
for some but not all 
areas, one of two 
speaking up metrics. 
* Johnson, H. & 
Kimsey, D. (2012). 
Patient safety: break the 
silence. AORN Journal, 
95(5), pp. 591–601. 
 
 
Report on a QI in a 
PA hospital's 
perioperative area, 
introduction of CRM, 
TeamSTEPPS, and 
communication 
techniques.  
Three-hour program titled 
“Enhancing Perioperative 
Teamwork to Improve 
Patient Safety”, video and 
discussion with audience 
response system. 
EDUCATION 
809 perioperative staff 
completed the course, 
including surgeons, 
residents, anesthesia 
providers, RNs, 
surgical techs and 
other staff 
Post course survey and 
number of Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) 
examined 
 
 
 
Majority felt they 
could better question 
authority and ask 
questions after training. 
RCAs dropped from 12 
to 4 a year (p. 600). 
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* Kent et al. (2014).  
Effects of a senior 
practicum course on 
nursing students’ 
confidence in speaking 
up for patient safety. 
Journal of Nursing 
Education54(3), pp. 
S12-S15. 
 
To examine the 
effects of a senior 
practicum and 
leadership course on 
nursing students' 
confidence in 
speaking up for 
patient safety 
 
 
8-week practicum and 
nursing leadership course 
for senior nursing students 
EDUCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 senior nursing 
students from a class 
of 84. Class was 
required but study was 
optional. 
 
 
 
 
 
Pretest-Posttest of 
perceptions with Health 
Professional Education 
in Patient Safety Survey 
(H-PEPSS). Reliability 
data provided from 
another study of a 
different population (p. 
S13). 
 
Increased perception of 
comfort of speaking up 
when witnessing 
unsafe practices, but no 
change in “difficulty 
questioning actions and 
decisions of those with 
more authority” (p. 
S14). 
 
McLaughlin, 
Winograd, Chung, Van 
de Wiele, & Martin 
(2014). Impact of the 
time-out process on 
safety attitude in a 
tertiary neurosurgical 
department World 
Neurosurgery 82(5), 
pp. 567–574. 
 
 
Assessed the impact 
of the current protocol 
for the time-out on 
healthcare providers 
safety attitude and 
operating room safety 
climate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Updated time-out process 
protocol put into use, 
added team member 
introductions, safety 
statement by leader in time 
out, two new checklist 
items, and pre-incision 
surgical care improvement 
project measures (p. 567).  
CHECKLIST & 
PROTOCOL 
 
93 of 128 surgical 
team members 
completed the survey. 
Includes surgeons, 
anesthesia providers, 
RNs, scrub techs, and 
neuromonitoring 
technicians. 
 
 
 
 
Locally designed survey 
based on the 
“phraseology” of the 
HSOPSC and SAQ was 
used to measure the 
safety attitudes in the 
neurosurgical OR teams 
(p. 568). 
 
 
 
 
No pretest, only post 
survey. Positive 
reaction to time out 
process in general and 
new requirement of 
team introductions, 
though they did not 
feel a time out 
necessarily “reinforced 
teamwork” (p. 572). 
Leader must set the 
tone. 
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* O’Connor et al. 
(2013). ‘Excuse me:’ 
Teaching interns to 
speak up. Joint 
Commission Journal on 
Quality and Patient 
Safety 39(9), pp. 426–
431. 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe a training 
needs assessment, 
which was followed 
by development and 
evaluation of the 
training program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small group, 90-minute 
training consisting of 
lecture and slides on 
human factors and 
communication skills 
followed by film clips of 
real stories and 
discussion, based on 
CRM (p. 428). 
EDUCATION 
 
 
110 interns completed 
training, 35 did not 
(control group). 
Training was 
mandatory, evaluation 
survey was not. One 
hundred completed the 
reactions questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
Pre- and posttests of 
knowledge and attitudes 
for all intervention 
groups, behavior for 
some. Control group did 
all three at the same 
time as the post testing. 
Two factors, speaking 
up about stress and 
speaking up to seniors, 
Cronbach’s for both 
were from 0.50 to 0.67 
(p. 429). 
Positive reaction to 
training but no 
significant effect from 
training on Stress scale 
and no significant 
differences between all 
groups after training in 
SU to seniors, 
including control. No 
sig. differences in 
behavior (p. 430). 
 
 
* Pannick et al. (2015). 
A stepped wedge, 
cluster controlled trial 
of an intervention to 
improve safety and 
quality on medical 
wards: the HEADS-UP 
study protocol. BMJ 
Open 5, pp. 1–9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To evaluate a new 
strategy to incorporate 
proactive team risk 
surveillance into 
routine care on 
general medical 
wards, with a 
facilitated 
organisational 
response: Hospital 
Event Analysis 
Describing Significant 
Unanticipated 
Problems (HEADS-
UP) 
Prompt-led team briefing 
called Hospital Event 
Analysis Describing 
Significant 
Unanticipated Problems 
(HEADS-UP) to be 
conducted on wards 
every 24 hours. 
CHECKLIST & 
PROTOCOL  
 
 
 
 
 
Entire ward staff, 
including physicians 
and pharmacy, OT, PT, 
etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plan to measure- 
Length of stay 
Mortality 
Readmission 
Complications of care 
Escalation of care 
Staff engagement with 
reporting system 
Safety and teamwork 
climate 
(p. 5) 
 
 
 
 
No results, article 
states they will be 
published at a later 
date. Lots of exclusion 
reasons to remove 
patients from data (p. 
4). 
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* Pian-Smith et al. 
(2009). Teaching 
residents the two-
challenge rule: a 
simulation-based 
approach to improve 
education and patient 
safety. Simulation in 
Healthcare 4, pp. 84–
91. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To determine whether 
a debriefing 
intervention that 
emphasizes 1 joint 
responsibility for 
safety and 2 the "two 
challenge rule" using 
a conversational 
technique that is 
assertive and 
collaborative 
(advocacy-inquiry) 
can improve the 
frequency and 
effectiveness with 
which residents 
“speak up” to 
superiors 
Two simulation cases, 
one before the 30- to 45-
minute education 
debriefing and one after. 
Both cases had chances 
to challenge at 3 levels, 
attending 
anesthesiologist, 
attending surgeon, and 
circulating nurse. 
Training emphasized the 
use of the two-challenge 
rule.  
SIMULATION & 
EDUCATION 
 
 
 
40 anesthesia trainees in 
years 1 through 4 of 
training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scored 1-5 by observer 
for challenging other 
staff; 1 was “say 
nothing” to 5 “use crisp 
advocacy-inquiry” (p. 
87). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase in challenging 
and quality of 
challenges to surgeons 
and anesthesia, not to 
RNs. Simulation 
results only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pronovost et al. (2004). 
Patient safety: senior 
executive adopt-a-work 
unit: a model for safety 
improvement. Joint 
Commission Journal on 
Quality and Safety 
30(2), pp. 59-68. 
 
 
Describe how we 
implemented the 
senior executive 
adopt-a-work unit 
program and present 
care descriptions of 
how it helped to 
improve patient safety 
in five ICUs at JHH 
 
Senior executives 
adopted various critical 
care units, meeting with 
the unit monthly to 
identify issues and work 
to address them. Part of a 
larger JHH Patient 
Safety Program 
LEADERSHIP 
INVOLVEMENT 
Staff of 5 ICUs and 
senior executives, one 
assigned to each ICU. 
Staff included nurses, 
physicians, ward clerks, 
any other unit staff. 
 
 
 
 
Unclear, goal is to 
identify problems and 
address them. Mention 
of survey of patient 
safety culture as well 
though no results. States 
it has been successful 
with the projects and 
encouraging speaking 
up. 
Examples given of 
projects undertaken in 
an area or success 
stories given in the 
article, but no 
quantified results or 
patient outcomes. 
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* Raemer et al. (2016). 
Improving 
Anesthesiologists’ 
Ability to Speak Up in 
the Operating Room: A 
Randomized Controlled 
Experiment of a 
Simulation-Based 
Intervention and a 
Qualitative Analysis of 
Hurdles and Enablers. 
Academic Medicine 
91(4), pp. 530–539. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Addressed three 
questions: 1. would a 
realistic simulation-
based educational 
intervention improve 
speaking-up behaviors 
of practicing non-
trainee 
anesthesiologist? 2. 
What would those 
speaking up behaviors 
be when the issue 
emanated from a 
surgeon, a circulating 
nurse, or an 
anesthesiologist 
colleague? 3. What 
were the hurdles and 
enablers to speaking 
up in those situations? 
50-minute workshop on 
speaking up incorporated 
into a mandatory 6-hour 
crisis management 
course. Intervention 
group received the 
intervention workshop 
before simulation was 
done and observed, 
control group after. 
Taught two challenge 
rule and advocacy plus 
inquiry (similar to Pian-
Smith et al. (2009) who 
was also an author on 
this study). 
SIMULATION & 
EDUCATION 
 
 
35 intervention group, 
36 control group. All 
practicing non-trainee 
anesthesiologists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observed for response to 
three opportunities to 
speak up, one to surgeon, 
one to anesthesiologist 
colleague, one to 
circulating nurse. Rated 
based on response 
categories on page 535 
Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There were no 
statistically significant 
differences between 
intervention and 
control groups 
speaking up behaviors. 
The authors rated the 
educational 
intervention 
“ineffective” (p. 530). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roh, H., Park, J., & 
Kim, T. (2015). Patient 
safety education to 
change medical 
students’ attitudes and 
sense of responsibility. 
Medical Teacher 37, 
pp. 908–914. 
 
 
Examined changes in 
the perceptions and 
attitudes as well as the 
sense of individual 
and collective 
responsibility in 
medical students after 
they received patient 
safety education 
 
Three-day patient safety 
program based on WHO 
patient safety guide for 
medical schools. Table 1 
(p. 909) shows the 
structure and content of 
the course 
EDUCATION 
 
 
Incoming third-year 
medical students, 
before beginning 
clinical clerkship, 103 
students. 
 
 
 
 
 
Local 12-item 
questionnaire to measure 
students’ understanding 
of the basic concepts of 
patient safety plus two 
vignettes that was 
answered qualitatively. 
98 of the 103 students 
completed the two 
measures. 
Improvements in 
understanding of 
patient safety and 
willingness to speak up 
about error to 
colleagues but speak 
up to senior doctor 
remained low though 
improved.  
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Sax et al. (2009). Can 
aviation-based team 
training elicit 
sustainable behavioral 
change? Arch Surg 
144(12), pp. 1133–
1137. 
 
 
 
 
 
To quantify effects of 
aviation-based crew 
resource management 
training on patient 
safety-related 
behaviors and 
perceived personal 
empowerment. 
 
 
 
 
6-hour course “Lessons 
from the cockpit”, 
bringing CRM concepts 
to healthcare. Held on 
weekends and offered 
CEs and compensatory 
time or malpractice 
premium reduction. 
EDUCATION 
& PROTOCOLS 
 
 
Two hospitals, NY 509 
trained, in RI 349 
trained. Of those 50% 
were nurses, 28% 
ancillary personnel, 
22% physicians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Checklist use, self-
reporting, and 10-point 
locally developed survey 
on empowerment; all 
before and after training.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase in 
empowerment scale 
though clear hierarchy 
in willingness to 
confront; checklist use 
went to 100% when 
scrub empowered to 
not hand knife until 
complete; incident 
reporting went from 
709 per quarter to 1481 
2 years post. 
* Sayre et al. (2012a). A 
strategy to improve 
nurses speaking up and 
collaborating for 
patient safety. JONA 
42(10), pp. 458-460. 
 
AND 
 
* Sayre et al. (2012b).  
An educational 
intervention to increase 
“speaking-up” 
behaviors in nurses and 
improve patient safety. 
J Nurs Care Qual 
27(2), pp. 154-160. 
 
To investigate 
whether in-service 
training could lead 
nurses to speak up, 
thereby enhancing 
perceptions of 
collaboration 
AND  
To evaluate an 
intervention designed 
to develop speaking-
up behaviors among 
RNs and positively 
affect their choice of 
available behavior 
options in situations 
which patient safety is 
in jeopardy 
Educational intervention 
with video from leaders, 
5 scenarios, discussion 
and development of a 
personal action plan and 
formed support groups 
for going forward.  
 
EDUCATION & 
SUPPORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control group of 87 
nurses, 58 RNs in 
intervention group, 
from 2 similar acute 
care hospitals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Speaking Up Measure 
and Individual List of 
Nurse Behaviors 
instrument pre and post 
surveys. The nurse 
behaviors were judged by 
a panel RN experts as 
free form answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase in both 
measures post 
intervention, no change 
in control group. Not 
clear if significant 
difference between 
control and 
intervention group?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. *  Increasing speaking up behaviors were an aim of their intervention.
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interventions aimed at nurses to four, the same number that had physicians and/or medical 
students as their population (Table 7). 
The intervention used in six of the studies was solely education, defined here as an in-
service, continuing education, or classroom-based instruction on speaking up behaviors 
(Delisle et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 2014; Johnson & Kimsey, 2012; Kent et al., 2014; 
O’Connor et al., 2013; Roh et al., 2015). Other studies augmented education with simulation 
or support groups to encourage speaking up behaviors (Raemer et al., 2009; Sayre et al., 
2012b). Results from the educational interventions varied. For example, Raemer et al. (2016) 
rated their education and simulation intervention as “ineffective,” finding no significant 
difference between the intervention and control groups (p. 530). Sax et al. (2009) saw 
improvement in checklist use, but this effect was seen after empowering the scrub technician 
or nurse to require completion of the checklist before they would hand the scalpel to the 
surgeon. These types of mixed results were common (Table 7). The study with the clearest 
positive results had an intervention that was very different from the other studies. Barzello-
Salazar et al. (2014) conducted a randomized controlled trial with medical students who did 
not receive any specific training on speaking up. The simulation exercise was manipulated by 
having the surgeon explicitly encourage the students to speak up or discourage them by 
appearing busy and telling them to “save your questions for next time” (p. 1004). In the 
encouraged group, 82% of students spoke up when the surgeon made a mistake, whereas in 
the discouraged group only 30% did (Barzallo-Salazar et al., 2014). The only difference was 
the attitude projected by the surgeon in the simulation (Barzallo-Salazar et al., 2014).  
Other interventions incorporated leadership rounds, checklists and protocols (Ashton, 
2014; Donnelly et al., 2010; McLaughlin et al., 2014; Pannick et al., 2015; Pronovost et al., 
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2004). Of those only Donnelly et al. (2010) provided any outcome data, showing a decrease 
in Serious Safety Events (SSEs) reported after changes were implemented. The changes 
implemented were extensive, including error prevention training, new cause-analysis 
program, and multiple other restructuring and education interventions (Donnelly et al., 2010). 
Instruments Used to Measure Speaking Up Behaviors 
A variety of instruments were used to measure speaking up behaviors. Most 
measures, like the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC), measured the 
perception speaking up behaviors as part of the assessment of perceived patient safety 
climate or culture (Sorra et al., 2016). The HSOPSC was used in sixteen studies, though in 
three studies it was modified from its original format. The HSOPSC is available in Appendix 
B. The HSOPSC was also translated into a language other than English for ten studies. Table 
8 shows those articles with modifications and translations of the HSOPSC, including what 
modifications, translated language and technique, and the Cronbach’s  of the translation, if 
provided. Communication Openness, the portion of the HSOPSC that is focused on speaking 
up behaviors, was the scale composite of greatest interest for this literature review. It is 
defined by the instrument authors as the extent to which “staff freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect a patient and feel free to question those with more 
authority” (Sorra et al., 2016, p. 3). When available, Cronbach’s  of the communication 
openness subscale is provided in Table 8.  
In studies of the reliability and validity of the HSOPSC, Sorra and Dyer (2010) 
reported a Cronbach’s  of 0. 73 for the communication openness dimension, while Belgen 
et al. (2009) reported 0.64 and 0.58, ratings from before and after their intervention. The 
Cronbach’s  from translations and modifications of the HSOPSC are reported in Table 8 if 
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they were available. Only one study (Mayer et al., 2011) reported Cronbach’s  (0.72) for 
communication openness that had not translated or modified the HSOPSC. For the eleven 
articles that reported translations and/or modifications of the HSOPSC, eight reported at least 
some of the reliability scores for the instrument. Six studies reported the Cronbach’s  for 
communication openness, with results ranging from 0.67 to -0.47, though it is difficult to 
judge if the -0.47 was an error as the article had multiple typographical errors (Nie et al., 
2013; Table 8). Only one translation and/or modification had a communication openness 
Cronbach’s  of over 0.6 (0.67, Verbeek-Van Noord, Wagner, Van Dyck, Twisk, & De 
Bruijne, 2013), the lower limit of reliability suggested by the instrument authors (Sorra & 
Dyer, 2010). 
Table 8 
HSOPSC Translations and Modifications 
Article Translation and/or Modification Reported Reliability Statistics 
Bowman et al., 2013.  
Enculturation of unsafe attitudes 
and behaviors: student 
perceptions of safety culture. 
 
 
Omitted 4 domains (26 questions) 
from the HSOPSC that they felt 
were not relevant for student 
population and combined the 
remaining survey with a local 
survey. 
No reliability statistics reported. 
Did list the modification as a 
limitation of the study. 
 
 
 
Burstrom et al., 2014.  
The patient safety culture as 
perceived by staff at two different 
emergency departments before 
and after introducing a flow-
oriented working model with 
team triage and lean principles: a 
repeated cross-sectional study 
Translated to Swedish and two 
dimensions added- Information 
and support to patients at adverse 
events and Information and 
support to staff at adverse events. 
 
 
 
No reliability statistics reported. 
Not discussed in limitations, 
HSOPSC characterized as 
“validated and widely used.” No 
discussion of translation except 
that the translation was “validated 
by the Swedish National Board of 
Health and Welfare” (p. 4). 
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Table 8 
Cont. 
Article Translation and/or Modification Reported Reliability Statistics 
El-Jardali et al., 2014.  
Patient safety culture in a large 
teaching hospital in Riyadh: 
baseline assessment, comparative 
analysis and opportunities for 
improvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translated to Arabic, pilot tested 
with 20 employees who are not in 
the final sample. Translation 
adapted from a study done in 
Lebanon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reports Cronbach’s Alphas for 12 
composites, ranging from 0.214 to 
0.892 (Table 2, p. 7). Discusses 
the statistics on pp. 12 & 14, 
including stating that the 
HSOPSC user’s guide states that 
0.6 and greater is acceptable. 
Discusses low scores found in 
other Middle East translations, 
from 0.4 & up. 
Communication Openness 
Cronbach’s  0.536 
Hamdan and Saleem, 2013.  
Assessment of patient safety 
culture in Palestinian public 
hospitals 
 
 
 
 
Arabic translation from the 
American HSOPSC version. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s reported, from 0.86 to 
0.38. Discussed in article that the 
low composites had been found in 
another Arabic translation and that 
the “translation of the tools needs 
to be improved” (p. 172). 
Communication Openness 
Cronbach’s  0.38. 
Khater et al., 2015.  
To assess patient safety culture in 
Jordanian hospitals from nurses’ 
perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
Arabic translation used with 
permission from an earlier 
Lebanon study, same as El-Jardali 
et al., 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s reported between 0.41 
and 0.78 for the current study. 
Mentions on p. 90 that studies are 
needed to “examine the 
composites of patient safety 
culture and other outcomes 
composites.” 
Communication Openness 
Cronbach’s   0.46. 
Nie et al., 2013.  
Hospital survey on patient safety 
culture in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese translation modified to 10 
dimensions with 29 items.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s reported between 0.75 
and -0.63 (Table 2), though in 
discussion states they ranged 
between 0.40 and 0.64 (p. 5) with 
an overall scale score of 0.84 (p. 
10).  
Communication Openness 
Cronbach’s  -0.47. Unclear if 
this a typo, multiple in the article.  
Shu et al., 2015. 
What does a hospital survey on 
patient safety reveal about patient 
safety culture of surgical units 
compared with that of other units? 
Chinese translation, 2 independent 
groups translated it then pilot 
tested, they adjusted the order of 
some questions 
 
Cronbach’s between 0.89 and 
0.26. Discussed as a limitation. 
Communication Openness 
Cronbach’s 0.48 
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Table 8 
Cont. 
Article Translation and/or Modification Reported Reliability Statistics 
Top & Tekingunduz, 2015. 
Patient safety culture in a Turkish 
public hospital: A study of nurses’ 
perceptions about patient safety 
Turkish translation by first author, 
verified by “an independent 
translator” (p. 92).  
 
Cronbach’s reported between 0.74 
and 0.82 with total scale at 0.76. 
Communication Openness not 
reported separately. 
Verbeek-Van Noord et al., 2013. 
Is culture associated with patient 
safety in the emergency 
department? A study of staff 
perspectives 
Dutch version of scale from an 
earlier study. 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s reported between 0.81 
and 0.47. Communication 
Openness Cronbach’s  0.67. 
 
 
Vlayen, Hellings, Claes, Peleman, 
& Schrooten, 2012. A nationwide 
hospital survey on patient safety 
culture in Belgian hospitals: 
setting priorities at the launch of a 
5-year patient safety plan 
Dutch and French translations. 
Validated was done by “using the 
original validation 
strategy”/statistics. No discussion 
of translation. 
 
Cronbach’s reported between 0.57 
and 0.85 for Dutch version. For 
French version 0.52 and 0.87. 
Communication Openness not 
reported separately 
 
Wagner, Smits, Sorra, & Huang, 
2013. Assessing patient safety 
culture in hospitals across 
countries. 
 
Dutch and Chinese translations for 
use in Netherlands and Taiwan, 
both using forward and back 
translation techniques and expert 
panel review. 
No reliability statistics reported. 
States validation statistics are 
available in cited article.  
 
 
 
 Other instruments were used in 50 studies. Many of these were locally created or 
more widely available instruments that were modified locally, and some were not well 
identified beyond statements like ‘a survey was administered.’ The HSOPSC was the most 
frequently used, with sixteen articles reporting results from HSOPSC. Variations of the 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) was the most commonly reported other instrument 
with nine articles, but it was discussed as being modified in almost all uses, or only certain 
scales were utilized from it. A wide variety of other scales and surveys were reported in the 
articles, many without any discussion of reliability or validity.  
Discussion 
It is clear that speaking up and its synonyms are widely discussed in the literature. It 
is also clear that speaking up is widely believed to be a positive behavior, as there were no 
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articles discouraging speaking up or whistleblowing among the 187 reviewed. What authors 
meant when they used the phrase was less clear. The interchangeability of terms varied 
widely. Whistleblowing and speaking up have not been thought to be the same thing by 
many, and whistleblowing articles were excluded by the authors of the most recent and often 
cited literature review of speaking up (Okuyama et al., 2014). However, it is clear from 
comparing definitions and discussions that most articles from Australia and many from the 
United Kingdom use the terms interchangeably (Ahern & McDonald, 2002; Bolsin et al., 
2011; Mansbach & Bachner, 2010). The term ‘report’ was also widely used, ranking fourth 
among synonyms for speaking up (Appendix A). But what is meant by the term “report” is 
often unclear as well. One source of definitions has fourteen different definitions for the verb 
report, including to simply “to relate or tell” and “to make a charge against (a person), as to a 
superior” (http://www.dictionary.com/browse/report). Clearly, “report” has a wide variety of 
meanings, especially in the context of patient safety and medical error. Report was used 
interchangeably with both speaking up and whistleblowing in many articles (Fagan et al., 
2016; Jackson et al., 2014; O’Connor et al., 2013). The ambiguity of the language used 
requires examination of the articles further to gain an understanding of what is meant by 
speaking up for patient safety. 
Article Sources, Types, and Focus 
 Most articles focused on something other than speaking up or whistleblowing. The 
majority of the articles were more broadly focused on patient safety or some other area of 
patient safety, like checklists or team training (McLaughlin et al., 2014; Wagner, Smits, 
Sorra, & Hijang, 2013). Speaking up was often mentioned in passing in discussion sections 
looking at results related to perceptions of communication between providers or as a 
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recommendation to improve communication (Donnelly et al., 2010; Fernandez, Tran, 
Johnson, & Jones, 2010). The majority of articles classified as studies were also focused on 
something other than speaking up or whistleblowing (Figure 3). This seems to indicate 
increasing speaking up behaviors is being most frequently looked at as a part of a larger issue 
or picture, one of many options to improve patient safety, but less frequently seen as a 
standalone concept or possible intervention. 
   The majority of the non-study articles were focused on speaking up and 
whistleblowing, which indicated that the healthcare community has talked a lot about 
speaking up in the years since To Err is Human, but spent less time actually studying it 
(Kohn et al., 2000). When the studies that did look at speaking up behaviors are reviewed, 
the most common studies were surveys. Most focused on participants’ perceptions of patient 
safety and/or communication (Berland, Natvig, & Gundersen, 2008; Bump et al., 2015). The 
second most common were qualitative studies, which explored perceptions or experiences 
with speaking up (Ahern & McDonald, 2002; Aydon, Hauck, Zimmer, & Murdoch, 2016; 
Johnston, Arora, King, Stroman, & Darzi, 2014). Out of the 110 studies reviewed, 76 were 
surveys or qualitative studies, including twenty focused on speaking up. This indicates that 
we have data about how healthcare professionals feel about and perceive speaking up and 
patient safety.  
In contrast, only 16 intervention studies looked at speaking up, and of those only ten 
had increasing speaking up behaviors as an aim (Table 7). Studies looking at the actual 
impact of speaking up behaviors on patient safety indicators are even rarer, with only two 
speaking up intervention studies reporting patient safety outcomes (Johnson & Kimsey, 
2012; Pannick et al., 2015). I conclude that while speaking up is a concern in the healthcare 
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literature, and speaking up is being encouraged, interventions to increase speaking up are 
scarce.  
Populations and Clinical Specialties of Interest 
 This literature review did not specifically target nurses, but the majority of articles 
were intended for or studied nurses. It might be inferred that nurses are the primary 
population being discussed in relation to speaking up behaviors, despite there being a clear 
argument that speaking up is an important behavior for all healthcare professionals (Blanco 
et al., 2009). Yet more interventions intended specifically for physicians and medical 
students were found then intended for nurses, which is puzzling in light of seeming overall 
focus on nurses. This seems to indicate the medical community is doing more testing of 
interventions to increase speaking up behaviors, even if they are not discussing it as much in 
the literature.   
 More articles are focused on the perioperative area than others, indicating a greater 
interest in speaking up behaviors in these areas. Errors in operating rooms (ORs) result in 
obvious and highly publicized errors, such as wrong site surgeries and retained surgical 
supplies (PSNet, June 2017). These errors led to pressure to institute measures to increase 
patient safety and decrease errors (Kowalczyk, 2014). Operating rooms are also known for 
having a steep hierarchy, with the attending surgeon at the top (Makary et al., 2006). 
Multiple studies have shown the unwillingness of staff to challenge attending surgeons in the 
OR and that surgeons frequently do not welcome being challenged (Makary et al., 2006; 
Rosenstein & O’Daniel, 2006; Sur, Schindler, Singh, Angelos, & Langerman, 2016). These 
data, coupled with the visibility of OR mistakes, may have led to a more studies in the 
perioperative areas than others. 
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Definitions and Operationalizations 
Speaking up is certainly a term in widespread use, though it is not often defined or 
operationalized. Even with broad search terms used to conduct this literature review, ‘speak 
up’ was the most commonly used term (Appendix A). “Raise concerns” and “whistleblower” 
were the next most common., Speaking up as a synonym to whistleblowing in articles from 
both Australia and United Kingdom, which makes including whistleblowing in any reviews 
of speaking up crucial (Jackson et al., 2010; Kelly & Jones, 2013). The interchangeability of 
these two words also indicates how varied speaking up is defined and used in healthcare. 
Although there is some agreement among definitions that both speaking up and 
whistleblowing for patient safety involve raising concerns or calling attention to an issue, the 
details about how, when, and to whom varied widely in the literature reviewed.  
Interestingly, even studies that were focused on speaking up behaviors, including 
those conducting interventions to increase the behavior, often failed to define speaking up. 
Within the 10 articles reporting on speaking up interventions, only three offered a definition 
for speaking up, and two of those articles reported on the same intervention (Sayre et al., 
2012a, 2012b; Raemer et al., 2016). It is possible this is due to the belief that speaking up is a 
generally understood term in health care, like patient safety or critical care, or that it is a 
considered a generic communication term, like calling or paging. But before any intervention 
is done a clear understanding of the desired outcome should be known, and this is difficult if 
the desired outcome is an undefined behavior.  
When speaking up was operationalized it was done so in a variety of ways with a 
variety of purposes (Table 6). Although tools were mentioned as being a way to 
operationalize speaking up, no study actually evaluated their use for this purpose, indicating 
 54 
that more research is needed on existing tools in relation to speaking up behaviors. A critical 
issue that needs to be addressed around how we define and operationalize speaking up is 
whether or not action beyond the speech act is needed for it to be speaking up. Some 
definitions include action beyond speech, and some operationalizations required it for the 
participants to have been considered to have spoken up (Tables 3 and 6). Do we judge 
professionals to have spoken up regardless of outcome, or is speaking up contingent upon 
actual action and change occurring? These questions need to be addressed by any 
investigator prior to any study of speaking up.  
Interventions to Increase Speaking Up Behaviors 
The mixed results from education-only interventions need to be considered when 
planning speaking up interventions. It is difficult to judge if this is from the education 
interventions themselves being ineffective or if this is an ineffective way to teach and 
encourage speaking up. Interventions aimed at increasing speaking up behaviors were also 
often packaged with other patient safety initiatives, making it more difficult to evaluate 
individual interventions. The impact of creating an environment that encourages speaking up 
should also be considered. The most successful reported intervention did not attempt to teach 
speaking up behaviors at all; instead it was focused on the impact the intended audience has 
on speaking up. It is possible that health care has been too focused on the actual act of 
speaking up and has not taken into account the importance of the intended audience and their 
response. Multiple examples can be found in the literature where nurses are described as not 
speaking up even though the incident described clearly indicates the nurse voiced a concern, 
sometimes repeatedly (Maxfield et al., 2011; Sayre et al., 2012b). Any future interventions 
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need to consider the impact of the intended audience on speaking up in addition to the act 
itself.  
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) 
  The HSOPSC was the most frequently used scale measuring speaking up behaviors, 
operationalized as communication openness (Sorra et al., 2016). The low reported reliability 
scores call into question the validity of measuring speaking up behaviors with the 
communication openness scale, especially when the measure is translated or altered in any 
way. Even Belgen et al. (2009) in testing an English, unaltered version of the HSOPSC got a 
Cronbach’s  of 0.58 on one trial, and a just over 0.64 on another. The problem could be the 
measure itself, or the problem could be the lack of understanding about what speaking up 
means in general, meaning people are responding to the question in very different ways. 
Clearly more work is needed to be sure we are even measuring perceptions of this behavior 
accurately.  
Conclusions 
 Speaking up is discussed frequently in the patient safety literature. Definitions vary, 
and there are many more articles and studies examining beliefs and perceptions around 
speaking up than those reporting intervention studies to increase speaking up. Results are 
also mixed among intervention studies as to the effectiveness of the few available 
interventions (Table 7). It is possible that speaking up needs to be conceptualized as 
multidimensional, as it appears that it is being used as a global term for raising concern about 
patient care. It may be helpful to look in non-healthcare disciplines for conceptualizations 
and definitions that could be brought in to clarify this term. Instruments also need to be 
reviewed to insure reliability, as statistics indicate some may not be capturing what is wanted 
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(Belgen et al., 2009; Nie et al., 2013). Although it appears to be universally agreed upon that 
speaking up is good and desirable in healthcare, there is far less agreement as to how 
speaking up should be defined and operationalized. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STUDY METHODS 
 
 
 Creswell’s (2014) explanatory sequential mixed methods design was used to 
complete this study. This method utilizes analysis of quantitative data to inform qualitative 
data collection and analysis. The quantitative data are collected and analyzed first, followed 
by qualitative data collection and analysis. The quantitative results are used to plan the 
qualitative portion of the study by informing the sampling procedures and to help decide the 
types of questions to be asked (Creswell, 2014). Once both phases of data collection and 
analysis are complete, the researcher then conducts a third phase of interpretation, looking at 
“how the qualitative findings help to explain the quantitative results” (Creswell, 2014, p. 
225). 
Phase 1: Quantitative Data for Purposive Sampling 
For this study, the quantitative portion was based on results from the Hospital Survey 
of Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) from the Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality 
(AHRQ; Appendix B). The HSOPSC has been administered by hospital staff since 2004 and 
is used by many hospitals in the United States. In 2016, data from 680 hospitals were 
submitted to the AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture User Comparative 
Database in 2016 (Hospital User Comparative Database Reports, 2016; Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture, 2016). The HSOPSC has 42 items that measure 12 patient safety 
dimensions. These dimensions fall under three levels, unit, hospital, and safety outcomes. 
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The twelve dimensions of the HSOPSC have been reported to have Cronbach’s Alpha 
reliability ratings between 0.62 and 0.85 in one analysis (Sorra & Dyer, 2010) and between 
0.44 and 0.83 in another (Blegen, Gearhart, O’Brien, Sehgal, & Alldredge, 2009). Factor 
analysis loadings for the dimensions were reported to be between 0.59 and 0.92 by Sorra and 
Dyer (2010), while Blegen et al. (2009) reported primary loadings between 0.437 and 0.851 
when the staffing dimension was excluded from analysis. The authors found the lowest factor 
loading for the staffing dimension and did not recommend its use as a subscale (Blegen et al., 
2009). 
The purpose of this study is to explore how nurses located on medical-surgical units 
understand the concept of speaking up for patient safety. The working definition of speaking 
up for patient safety being used in this study is “the raising of concerns by health care 
professionals for the benefit of patient safety and care quality upon recognizing or becoming 
aware of the risky or deficient actions of others within health care teams in a hospital 
environment” (Okuyama et al., 2014, p. 1). The HSOPSC dimension of interest for this study 
is communication openness, which is defined as “the extent to which staff will freely speak 
up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care, and feel free to question 
those with more authority,” a definition which aligns closely with the working definition of 
speaking up (Sorra et al., 2016, p. 3). Internal reliability of the communication openness 
scale has varied from 0.58 (Blegen et al., 2009) to 0.73 (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). HSOPSC 
scores reflect answers as a percentage of subjects responding positively, with any answer of 
“agree” or “strongly agree” included in the percentage (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). A higher 
percentage indicates that staff perceives higher communication openness on their unit. 
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The purpose of this study is to explore the experiences of nurses working in adult 
medical surgical areas, not including those labeled as intensive care or operating rooms. The 
aims are (a) to examine how nurses are defining and operationalizing speaking up in their 
work, (b) to explore the situational and environmental factors that impact nurses speaking up 
and silence behaviors, and (c) to evaluate the emotional and psychological impacts of 
speaking up of nurses. Nurses on medical surgical units were chosen because most of the 
studies to date have focused on intensive care and perioperative areas, with only three of 187 
studies reviewed focused on medical-surgical units. Medical-surgical nurses are the largest 
specialty group in nursing and tend to have a larger patient load and different issues than 
intensive care and operating room nurses (www.amsn.org). Adding the experiences of these 
nurses to the existing studies done with other specialties will help create a more complete 
understanding of speaking up for patient safety among nurses. 
Following approval of the study from the UNC Institutional Review Board and the 
UNC Nursing Research Council, de-identified data from the 2013 and 2015 HSOPSC 
administered at UNC Hospitals was used to identify medical-surgical units that had reported 
different levels of communication openness. Fifteen units were identified at UNC Main 
Hospitals that fit the profile of being adult medical surgical units and were ordered from the 
highest communication openness score, 87%, to the lowest 41%. As the goal with a 
phenomenology study is a heterogeneous sample, the plan was to conduct interviews with 
nurses on floors with a variety of communication openness scores, as this would increase 
variation in their experiences with speaking up. Sampling was focused on the units with the 
lowest and highest levels of communication openness first, and participants were added from 
the units scoring in the middle range. In both studies that evaluated the HSOPSC, the 
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researchers reported the survey was sensitive to differences between units, a key issue for the 
purpose of this study. Sorra and Dyer (2010) found intraclass correlations (ICCs) between 
.06 to .23 at the hospital nursing unit level, indicating that 6% to 23% of differences in 
individual responses could be attributed to unit membership (p. 7). Blegen et al. (2009) found 
that the HSOPSC administered before and after an intervention had ICCs of the mean 
interrater reliability for communication openness of 0.3822 and 0.8722 respectively. The 
sensitivity to the differences between units was key to obtaining a heterogonous sample for 
the phenomenology interviews. 
Phase 2: Qualitative Interviewing 
 The qualitative portion of this explanatory sequential mixed methods design took the 
form of a phenomenological study exploring medical surgical nurses’ experiences with 
speaking up for patient safety. Phenomenology focuses on describing “the common meaning 
for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon,” with a basic 
purpose to “reduce individual experiences with a phenomenon to a description of the 
universal essence” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, loc. 1719). Phenomenology has its roots in early 
20th century philosophy, most commonly associated with German mathematician Edmund 
Husserl and those who expanded on his work, primarily Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-
Ponty (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013; Walters, 1995). Although 
there are multiple perspectives within phenomenology, they do share some common 
philosophical assumptions. These include: focus on the study of the lived experience of 
people; the idea that these experiences are conscious ones; and the importance of 
descriptions, not explanations or analyses (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The relationship between 
consciousness of self and object is essential in phenomenology, often referred to as the 
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intentionality of consciousness (Creswell & Poth, 2018; LeVasseur, 2003). The object can be 
concrete or material, like an apple, or a concept or idea like grief. Whether one can touch or 
see an object or not, it cannot be understood separate from one’s consciousness. 
Consciousness is always directed toward an object, and the two are always linked. “Reality 
of an object, then, is inextricably related to one’s consciousness of it” (Creswell & Poth, 
2018, loc. 1748). This is why in phenomenology the lived experience is key. The object and 
the consciousness are always linked, so to understand any concept or phenomenon we must 
study how people experience it. Although how people experience any phenomenon can and 
does vary, there are usually similarities between experiences. An apple, for example, may be 
a perceived differently on some levels for different people, (tastes good, tastes bad; healthy, 
too much sugar), but there are universal characteristics that are described by people in 
relation to their experience with an apple. These universal characteristics are referred to as 
the “essentials” of the experience and make up the essence of the phenomenon (Creswell & 
Poth, 2018). Describing this essence is the goal of phenomenology (Creswell & Poth, 2018). 
 For this study, descriptive, transcendental, or psychological phenomenology based on 
Moustakas (1994) was used. This type of phenomenology is focused on describing the 
experiences of the participants more so than hermeneutical or existential phenomenology, 
which places more emphasis on the interpretations of the researcher (Creswell & Poth, 2018; 
LeVasseur, 2003; Moustakas, 1994). It also attempts to “bracket” the researcher from the 
study, a concept where a researcher sets aside their own experiences to perceive the 
phenomenon naively (Moustakas, 1994). Bracketing is controversial in phenomenology as it 
seems to clash with the main underlying assumptions around consciousness and object, in 
that we can never truly separate our consciousness from anything, and therefore we are 
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always influenced by our past experiences and knowledge (LeVasseur, 2003). Hermeneutical 
phenomenology does not attempt to bracket, instead the researcher discusses their own 
experiences in relation to the concept under study, and acknowledge these experiences 
influence of analysis of the study data (Creswell & Poth, 2018). However, Moustakas (1994) 
and others argue that although bracketing is difficult to achieve, it is important for gaining a 
fresh perspective and broader understanding of a phenomenon. Therefore, bracketing was 
used in this study (Creswell & Poth, 2018; LeVasseur, 2003). Bracketing was done by the 
study author by fully exploring and describing her experiences with the phenomenon in 
advance of undertaking any interviewing in an attempt to recognize and set aside any 
preconceived ideas about the phenomenon (Creswell & Poth, 2018). 
  Criterion purposeful sampling, where a sample is chosen from those who have meet 
a predetermined criterion, was used for this study (Guest et al., 2013). The criterion for 
sampling was that medical-surgical nurses on one of the identified hospital units needed to 
have at least one experience with speaking up for patient safety. The HSOPSC data allowed 
for identification of units with different levels of communication openness, with the goal of a 
heterogeneous sample of nurses who had experience with speaking up. After obtaining 
approval from the University Institutional Review Board and the hospital Nursing Research 
Council, and gaining the permission of unit managers, a flyer was distributed by email and 
posted in unit breakrooms to recruit nurses for the study (Appendix C). Study participants 
were given a $10 gift card for their time. Suggested sample size for phenomenology studies 
is usually between 5 and 20, with sampling coming to an end when no new themes are 
emerging with new participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The emergence of no new themes 
is referred to as theoretical saturation (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Guest et al., 2013). 
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 Data collection for this study was done in the form of in-depth interviews, conducted 
in person or by telephone, which were recorded and then transcribed. All participants chose 
to complete their interviews over the phone. Consent was obtained from all participants 
through the completion of the IRB-approved verbal consent form, that was reviewed verbally 
with the participant before the interview. Each interview opened with the two main questions 
used for this type of phenomenology study: “What have you experienced in terms of the 
phenomenon (speaking up)?” “What contexts or situations have typically influenced or 
affected your experiences of the phenomenon (speaking up)? “(Moustakas, 1994). Other 
open-ended questions were also asked to gain thorough descriptions of the participants’ 
experiences. For example, the question, “How do you define the term speaking up?” helped 
elicit how nurses were defining speaking up. Appendix D contains the interview guide for 
this study. Any participant identifiers were stored separately from the transcripts, with 
original digital recordings stored on an approved and encrypted laptop and any personal 
information collected for possible follow up stored separately from interview recordings or 
transcripts in a locked cabinet. 
The transcripts were then entered into ATLAS.ti 8 data management software and 
analyzed individually for significant statements and quotes that reflected the participant’s 
experience with speaking up. Saldaña (2016) calls this theming, where from these statements 
and quotes, theoretical constructs or meaning units were identified, combining the significant 
statements and quotes of the participants into common themes (Creswell & Poth, 2018; 
Saldaña, 2016). The data was also coded using a method referred to as eclectic coding, “a 
purposeful and compatible combination of two or more first cycle coding methods” (Saldaña, 
2016, p. 293). First cycle coding refers to the first analysis of the qualitative data, the same 
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level as finding significant statements in horizonalization (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Saldaña, 
2016). The three codes were emotion, In Vivo, and versus. Emotion coding looks to label the 
emotions experienced by the participants, while In Vivo uses the participant’s own language 
in words or short phrases as codes, similar to theming (Saldaña, 2016). Versus coding 
identifies binary or dichotomous terms and conflicts, which can help identify competing 
goals and power imbalances participants experience (Saldaña, 2016). Versus coding is useful 
when looking at situations with competing goals and intercultural conflict, such as a hospital 
setting were nurses are dealing with other healthcare professionals and often encounter 
conflicts between administration expectations, patient needs, and provider demands. 
 The codes from the eclectic coding were reviewed in a second cycle of coding using 
pattern coding, which assigned a category label or meta code to similarly coded data from the 
first cycle, similar to the theoretical constructs from Moustakas (1994) method. These 
categories were compared to the theoretical constructs found in the theming for similarities 
and differences. These common themes and categories were developed into the textural 
description, “or what happened,” and the structural description, “how the phenomenon was 
experienced” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, loc. 4088; Moustakas, 1994). These two descriptions 
were then combined into the composite description, or “essence” of the phenomenon 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). The data analysis was ongoing during the data collection period, 
and participants were asked if they were willing to be contacted again for possible follow up 
interview or to review findings with the researcher. 
 Reviewing findings with participants, or member checking, was one of the validation 
strategies used for this study. Participants who had agreed to be contacted again were asked 
to review the primary data analysis result, the composite description or essence of speaking 
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up, and provided feedback as to how well it reflected their experiences. Validation refers to 
the “process for assessing the accuracy of the findings as best described by the researcher and 
the participants” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, loc. 5177). Another method to increase validation 
that was used was bracketing to clarify researcher bias. (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The author 
was the only coder for this study, as it was completed as part of a dissertation and there were 
no volunteers to co-code. A second coder will be recruited before the study is sent for review 
prior to publication, as multiple coders are important to ensure reliability of the findings 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). Although a second coder will be sought, it is not uncommon in 
descriptive phenomenology for the participants to be considered “co-researchers” and their 
review of the data to be sufficient (Moustakas, 1994, p. 111). Reliability refers to “the 
stability of responses to multiple coders of data sets,” and is important to ensure reliable 
interpretation of the data (Creswell & Poth, 2018, loc. 5371). However, with descriptive 
phenomenology the focus is not on interpretation, it is on describing the experiences of the 
“co-researchers,” so more importance is placed on member checking (Moustakas, 1994). 
Utilizing the HSOPSC results allowed me to target my sampling to increase the 
chances of a heterogeneous sample of medical-surgical nurses, which is the goal in a 
phenomenology study. By taking the most diverse experiences with speaking up for patient 
safety among this population and exploring them for the common themes and emotions, I 
was able to gain a clear picture of what speaking up for patient safety meant to these nurses. 
The utilization of clear data analysis framework and analysis software, combined with 
member checking and bracketing of my own experiences, increased the validity of the 
findings. These findings are presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 After receiving approval from both the Institutional Review Board and the hospital’s 
Nursing Research Council, recruitment began in May of 2017 for interview participants for 
the qualitative portion of this research project. Recruitment was done through a combination 
of flyers posted on nursing units at the hospital and emails sent out by unit managers. Three 
different waves of recruitment were done. In May 2017 recruitment began on the first four 
units, those with highest and lowest levels of communication openness according to the 
results of Hospital Survey, on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Table 9). Recruitment was 
increased to all 15 units in August of 2017, and in October 2017 another round of recruitment 
with emails and flyers was done. Between May and December, ten participants completed 
interviews about their experiences with speaking up for patient safety. 
 All interviews were completed over the phone after verbal consent was obtained. The 
interviews followed the interview guide found in Appendix D. Interviews lasted between 22 
and 41 minutes, averaging 29 minutes. Interviews were recorded and then transcribed from 
the recordings by a transcription service. All transcriptions were checked against the 
recordings by the author before being imported into Atlas.ti 8 for data analysis. 
 There are at least two ways to present phenomenology study results discussed in the 
literature: the essence can be presented in the beginning of the paper or at the end; both are 
considered acceptable (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994). For this study, I have 
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chosen to present the essence of the phenomenon in the beginning, with the themes, verbatim 
examples, and synthesis of meanings presented after (Moustakas, 1994). It is also common 
for study authors to reflect on their own personal experiences with a phenomenon, if it relates 
to them (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994). My personal reflections are presented in 
the conclusion of this paper. 
Table 9 
Units of Interest for Speaking Up Study—HSOPSC Rankings 
 
Unit Identifier 
Communication Openness 
2015 Ranking 
 
C4 2015 Ranking 
Unit 1 1 1 
Unit 2 15 15 
Unit 3 2 6 
Unit 4 14 14 
Unit 5 3 3 
Unit 6 13 13 
Unit 7 4 3 
Unit 8 12 6 
Unit 9 4 11 
Unit 10 11 8 
Unit 11 6 10 
Unit 12 10 11 
Unit 13 7 2 
Unit 14 7 8 
Unit 15 9 5 
Note. 1= highest Communication Openness scores among these units in 2015; 15= lowest Communication 
Openness scores; C4 Refers to the Communication Openness item most related to this study. 
 
Participants 
 The ten participants came from six different adult medical-surgical areas of the 
hospital. They were all Registered Nurses and all were female. Their work experience ranged 
from over twenty years in nursing to fewer than one, and they had been on their current units 
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from over five years to fewer than six months. Those nurses that had worked on more than 
one unit in their careers were free to share experiences from past units, and many chose to. 
The primary goal of the interviews was to gain a “description of the universal of essence” of 
the phenomenon of medical-surgical nurses speaking up for patient safety, so all of their 
experiences enriched the description (Creswell & Poth, 2018, loc. 1719). 
The Phenomenon of Speaking Up 
 Speaking up for patient safety is viewed as an important and required part of their 
role as a nurse. Key aspects voiced by nurses were identifying the problem that could cause 
the patient harm and bringing it to the attention of someone who could address it. Providing 
suggestions and recommendations when nurses raised concerns was also important. Speaking 
up was viewed by nurses successful if the patient was safe and the nurse got the desired 
response from whomever they brought the problem. Perceived danger to the patient’s 
wellbeing was the most important factor influencing these nurses’ willingness to speak up. 
Past experiences with speaking up and the anticipated response also strongly impacted their 
techniques and willingness to raise concerns. Nurses did not situate speaking up in any 
particular environment or situation; speaking up was considered an integral part of nursing 
on any unit and in all situations. The primary emotions around speaking up were frustration 
and discomfort, though successful speaking up led to positive emotions like satisfaction and 
happiness. 
Role of Nurse 
I definitely think nurses are all on the same page. We all feel the same way. We have 
to speak for our patients when they can’t. (Nurse J) 
 
 Speaking up was seen as a type of advocacy, and all the nurses felt this was a critical 
role for nurses. Advocacy has long been viewed as a core duty of nurses and is part of the 
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American Nurses Association (ANA) definition of nursing (FAQ, n.d.). The nurses 
interviewed clearly embraced this role, to the point that if they thought they could not 
advocate they should leave the profession. One nurse, who had reached a point she felt she 
could no longer speak up for her patient talked about how she was thinking of leaving 
nursing. 
I’m at a crossroads. Do I stay in nursing or do I get out to find a different profession? 
Because what the hell am I in this field for? I'm not doing good care for my patient if 
I’m not speaking up for them. (Nurse A) 
 
Speaking up was described as important as the nurse was both literally the patient’s voice 
when the patient couldn’t speak, and the patient’s last line of defense from harm. 
 Being at the bedside was also a defining factor of the nurses’ role and clearly tied to 
speaking up. Nurses are with the patients for 8- to 12-hour shifts around the clock and this 
time spent with the patients, along with the intimacy of the care given, leads to both feelings 
of responsibility and a belief they know the patients better than other care providers. “I’m the 
one at the bedside and I know what I see. I know my patient” (Nurse J). This knowing of the 
patient was viewed as another aspect of the role of nurse, as was the responsibility to provide 
the best possible care while on duty. The nurses often spoke of being there for the patients; 
their focus was on keeping their patients’ safe, another key aspect of their role as a nurse. 
“Always my patients come first, their safety, their health and welfare” (Nurse E). This sense 
of responsibility to keep the patient safe often led to raising concerns with providers and 
management. The first step in the process of speaking up for patient safety was identifying 
the problem. 
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Identifying the Problem 
 “I noticed over a progression of three nights that this patient was starting to have 
some edema in one of his extremities” (Nurse I) 
The two themes most related to identifying the problem were nursing judgement and 
at the bedside. The amount of time the nurses spent with the patient at the bedside, providing 
hands on care, placed them in an excellent position to identify threats to safety. These threats 
were identified using nursing judgement, which the nurses relied on and felt improved with 
time in nursing. Nursing judgement was described by the nurses as a feeling, their instincts, 
or just “knowing.” 
Just from experience, from the amount of patients you worked with, the type of 
patients you worked with, the conditions that they are having, they may not always 
have abnormal vital signs, or they may not always have the signature things that 
people look for, but you as a nurse, sometimes you feel they are just sicker. They are 
requiring more care, they are requiring attention. You feel like they will be better off 
with closer monitoring. (Nurse H) 
 
Although nurses relied on their nursing judgement to identify problems, they often 
expressed that it was not enough of a reason to bring the problem to another healthcare 
professional, especially a physician. They felt they needed a concrete reason before they 
approached a provider, defined here as physicians or mid-level providers who are part of the 
medical or surgical team caring for the patient. Objective symptoms, like blood pressure 
issues, were acceptable reasons to contact the provider. More subjective concerns, like Nurse 
H described above, were not usually seen as a good enough reason. 
The most common identified threats were declining patient status, inappropriate 
orders, need for a higher level of care/greater supervision, and inaccessibility of providers. 
Declining patient status was often discussed with inaccessibility of providers, as multiple 
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nurses felt the providers did not respond to concerns fast enough when patients weren’t doing 
well. 
One of the bigger issues that we have with our surgical patients is a lack of 
responsiveness from physicians, and that's any time, day or night. We find them to 
just be very hard to get in touch with, and with a changing patient condition that can 
be a big safety risk. (Nurse I) 
 
 This inaccessibility of providers effected almost every other problem as well, as 
getting orders changed or transferring patients to different levels of care required the 
provider’s assistance. Once a problem was identified, nurses began the often-long process of 
bringing the problem to someone who could address it. 
Bringing the Problem to Someone Who Can Address It 
 “I advised the physician, I said, ‘Hey, I think this is too much bleeding, I really think 
that you should come see the patient and I think you should do something.’” (Nurse D) 
 The most common way to contact another healthcare professional was either by 
paging or going to them in person. If it was a provider, paging was most common. For 
management, defined here as nurses holding positions of authority higher than the 
staff/bedside nurse, the most common way was to go talk to them in person. Nurses felt they 
had to have a reason beyond nursing judgement to go to the provider about a patient. Their 
concerns, based on that judgment, had to have concrete evidence before many nurses felt 
comfortable approaching a provider. It was important to “have my rationale ready to go” as 
Nurse F phrased it before contacting anyone. Or, if they had doubts about raising concerns, 
they would start with their own management before going to a provider, usually the charge 
nurse. Sometimes this meant just running their reasons and concerns past the charge nurse 
before calling, sometimes this meant they had the charge nurse do the speaking up for them. 
Though many nurses did this confirmation of nursing judgement on their own, on one floor 
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the nurse reported they had recently been told by management and the providers that at night 
they were required to talk to the charge nurse before paging. 
I guess they felt like they were getting a lot of unnecessary pages overnight. And so 
they wanted us to confer with our charge nurses, and have the charge nurses handle 
everything that they could first. So to not page overnight, to avoid if at all possible. 
(Nurse I) 
 
When nurses faced issues such as being discouraged from paging or no response to 
page, two themes emerged: time and persistence. Time was spent preparing to page by 
gathering support for their concerns, making the actual calls, and waiting for provider 
response. Sometimes there was no response at all, or a response could take anywhere from 
twenty minutes to over five hours. “Having to page three, or four times to get a response” 
was reported by Nurse I and others, with having to page more than twice a common issue. 
The slowness of providers to respond was also reported as an issue, as nurses often felt their 
patients’ conditions worsened while they were waiting. As mentioned above, this delay in 
response was viewed by the nurses as detrimental to the patient. 
The lack of responsiveness from providers led to nurses needing to be very persistent 
to get their patients’ needs met. Repeated paging, involving the charge nurse, and working 
their way up the provider hierarchy were all listed as methods of persistence. Nurse C 
reported spending “probably like five hours” trying to get an unstable patient moved to a 
higher level of care while “his condition was getting worse.” This lack of responsiveness was 
often attributed to three things; providers were busy, lacked faith in nursing judgement, or 
there were different opinions between nurses and physicians as to what needed to be done. 
Nurse H talked about how the providers are “backed up sometimes,” and Nurse E mentioned 
how they are “in a hurry” and have “got to go scrub up for OR.” Night nurses mentioned that 
there was usually one inexperienced provider like an intern covering “hundreds” of patients, 
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which multiple nurses mentioned they felt was unsafe and certainly delayed care (Nurse E). 
The perceived lack of faith in nursing judgement intensified nurses’ feeling that they needed 
a concrete reason for even contacting a provider, as discussed above. This perception also left 
nurses feeling as if the providers were not interested in their concerns or did not think nurses’ 
concerns were very important. Nurse D, in talking about a past experience where she had felt 
her concerns were disregarded, put it this way: “It makes me feel like I’m not respected as a 
nurse and that my opinion doesn’t matter. It makes me feel like they think I know nothing, 
and I know that’s not true.” The most common differences of opinion seemed to come in 
terms of level of care needed. Nurses spoke of assessing that their patients needed more 
monitoring than they could provide but being unable to get them moved to a higher level or 
get more help, like a sitter for the room. Nurse C talked about how she felt one of her patients 
was unsafe as “we can’t monitor the patient how they need to be monitored for that type of 
issue,” and Nurse H talked about the safety risk created when a patient needs greater care 
than that which the unit is staffed to handle. 
A lot of times what happens is that it causes our staff to become short because if there 
is really a truly inherent safety risk, we’ll have to use one of our NAs to sit with the 
patient. Sometimes that leaves the floor with no NA. I think when you have no NA 
and it’s just the nurses, or when you are short staffed period, I think that’s a safety 
concern because of how aware you have to be as a nurse. How many details you have 
to keep in your head, how many things you have to pay attention to if you don’t have 
that extra helper. That’s a general safety issue period because you are just not going 
to catch as many things as you would. You are not going to be able to stay on the top 
of it especially through 12 hours. 
 
But providers often appeared uninterested in these types of problems, which did lead a few 
nurses to speaking up to management in hopes of improving situations they felt were unsafe. 
Only two nurses talked about speaking up to management beyond using management 
to facilitate speaking up to providers. Both of the nurses who talked about speaking up to 
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management had over 10 years of nursing experience, and both brought issues about how the 
unit operated to management. One of them felt she had been fired from one unit for speaking 
up about safety issues, and the other discussed how she felt her speaking up was usually 
ignored due to what she called “the okeydokey syndrome.” “You feel like you’re not 
believed because they don’t want to hear it” (Nurse E). Both of these nurses talked about 
management just wanting to ignore safety issues. One of them did share a past success story 
where they had changed a transfer process and improved communication between services 
after she had spoken up about the issues she was seeing. But that same nurse had also been 
fired from a unit for “not fitting in” after she had brought a safety concern to her manager. 
That experience had now left her more focused on self-preservation and considering leaving 
nursing altogether. 
But if I come to you with the safety problem, then you're going to be negative at me 
to make me feel like, do it again, you're out of here, or they’ll make it very difficult 
for you. It's very, very negative that they will train you to go into your corner, and if 
you don’t get the message, you're out of here. So it makes it for like, a negative 
environment, and how much do you keep going to work in that kind of environment. 
(Nurse A) 
 
The negative responses she had received when she had brought forth safety concerns 
not only discouraged her from speaking up again, they were also making her consider leaving 
nursing. Response, both the anticipated one and what is actually said, clearly impact speaking 
up behaviors. Part of the nurses’ way of influencing the response they received was to 
provide a recommendation when speaking up. 
Providing Recommendations 
I went ahead and just tried to facilitate and speak up for the patient that it would 
probably be best, if they’re in that gray area and they’re staying there, let’s go ahead 
and move them to ICU. (Nurse G) 
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 Having a recommendation, even one as simple as requesting the provider at the 
bedside, was expressed as a frequent part of speaking up. Though it was mixed as to whether 
or not it was required. Some nurses provided a recommendation to reinforce that they had a 
clear understanding of the problem and their concerns should be taken seriously. Others used 
recommendations to clearly state what their goal was in contacting the other professional. 
Some nurses talked about talking to the doctor and even when directly asked for their 
opinion, responding with statements like “we want you to be the doctor, make these calls 
because it is your job” (Nurse B) and “you went to med school, I didn’t and that’s for you to 
figure out” (Nurse E). But other nurses felt having a recommendation was important, 
reporting making recommendations from asking for the physician to come to the bedside to 
letting them know “I think you need to either stitch it back up or just do something” when an 
incision was bleeding too much (Nurse D). So, although recommendations were common, 
they were not seen as required for speaking up by all participants. This made a major 
difference in how nurses then viewed the success of their speaking up. If they were looking 
for a response, such as a response to a recommendation they made, whether or not they got 
what they had hoped impacted how successful they viewed their speaking up. 
Success Versus Failure 
 I raised a valid point, and there was valid action brought on that point. (Nurse I) 
 Success of speaking up was judged mostly in relation to the patient. If they felt the 
patient was safe and receiving proper care, nurses were satisfied with the outcome of their 
raising concerns. The other big indicator of success was response received. Primarily, nurses 
were looking for any valid, professional response, even if it was disagreement. Nurses spoke 
frequently about feeling like no one was listening. “Sometimes I feel like they are listening to 
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me but not really hearing what I'm saying” (Nurse E). “It’s frustrating when you maybe feel 
like your voice isn’t getting heard” (Nurse B). “Some (providers) are just nicer and willing to 
listen” (Nurse D). Three nurses talked about what would be classified as disruptive behavior 
from providers in response to their speaking up. Disruptive behavior is defined as 
“inappropriate conduct, whether in words or actions, that interferes with, or has the potential 
to interfere with, quality health care delivery” (Leape et al., 2012, p. 846, attributed to 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). Two nurses reported being yelled at, and 
one nurse reported an instance where she saw her colleague shoved and shouted at by a 
provider during an emergency situation. This type of response was viewed as very 
unsuccessful by the nurses and made them not want to speak up. Nurse D spoke about being 
yelled at by providers when attempting to speak up for her patients, and when asked about 
how this made her feel about speaking up she stated- “I wouldn’t want to. It makes me not 
want to. It makes me feel like I’m not respected as a nurse and that my opinion doesn’t 
matter.” However, even those nurses who talked about unsuccessful and disrespectful 
interactions following speaking up stated that they would not stop speaking up. They all 
viewed it as a key aspect of the nursing role and therefore felt they had to keep doing it for 
their patients if they felt it was a serious safety concern. When nurses were asked if they had 
ever stayed silent on an issue or given up before getting the outcome they wanted, all nurses 
agreed that they had. But they all also agreed that if they did give up or stay silent it was 
because they didn’t think it was a serious enough safety issue to require them to speak up. 
If I’m going to drop an issue, it’s not going to be something that’s going to directly 
harm the patient. Like if it’s something that’s going to directly harm the patient or 
something that’s unnecessary or something like that, I would speak up. (Nurse F) 
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For the nurses, success was defined by keeping their patients safe and getting them 
what they needed, preferably through respectful and professional interactions with providers 
or management. Being listened to and getting a response that addressed their concern 
contributed to nurses’ feelings of success, but being ignored, disregarded, or disrespected 
contributed to feelings of failure. 
The Emotions of Speaking Up 
If it is successful you feel like happy, like you’re contributing something and you’re 
needed by the team. Then I guess if they go unsuccessful it’s awkward and frustrating. 
(Nurse F) 
 
 Most of the emotions nurses discussed around speaking up for patient safety were 
negative ones (Table 10). The nurses often felt uncomfortable and intimidated when speaking 
up, and process of raising concerns and the responses they received frequently led to feeling 
frustrated and disrespected. Feeling uncomfortable speaking up was strongly related to their 
doubt about the validity of their claims or was related to their fears about how it would be 
received. The two factors of increased knowledge and experience in nursing positively 
impacted emotions about speaking up, leading to higher confidence and comfort with 
speaking up. As Nurse G discussed when she talked about how her speaking up had evolved:  
I feel like when I first started I was always really hesitant to speak up because, and I 
think it depends a lot on personalities too because some people are just much more 
aggressive, I feel like in the beginning in nursing and even like sometimes still today, 
I'm not 100% confident in myself all the time, so, it makes it hard to know when to 
speak up because I’m like, well maybe I’m just wrong, you know? But I feel like with 
time that really improved and with time like you recognize things faster or, you know, 
and just like your understanding and your comfort level is better. So, I feel like, now, 
a few years after graduating, I'm much more comfortable than I was then to speak up 
or at least to feel that confidence and that, in that mentality that like, well, if you 
speak up, you know, it can’t ever hurt anything. So, why ever hesitate, you know? 
But I definitely don’t feel I felt that way in the beginning of graduating in nursing 
school. I think in the beginning it’s still so intimidating. 
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Table 10 
Emotions around Speaking Up 
Positive Emotions Negative Emotions 
Satisfaction 
Happiness/Glad 
Confidence 
Respected 
Relief 
At ease 
Valued 
 
 
 
 
Frustrated 
Uncomfortable 
Disrespect 
Anxious 
Fear 
Annoyance 
Intimidated  
Irritated 
Awkward 
Passive 
Know nothing 
 
Nurses who were more experienced and had more knowledge about that which they 
were speaking up were more confident about speaking up. However, if nurses’ prior 
experiences were negative, they had more fear about speaking up, especially if the person 
they were speaking up to was known to respond poorly. Nurses were more willing to speak 
up if they had positive experiences and were more fearful if they had negative experiences. 
Nurse A, who had been fired from a job for speaking up at one point in her over 20 years in 
nursing, expressed a lot of anxiety and fear around speaking up, “I’m scared, I’m scared.” 
Even with her fears, she did continue to speak up, but it was clearly an uncomfortable and 
unpleasant experience for her. Nurses who had not had negative prior experiences were much 
more confident in their abilities to speak up, even if they lacked Nurse A’s years of nursing 
experience. Emotions around speaking up were clearly tied to prior experiences. 
Frustration was a widely discussed emotion, mostly relating to the response, or lack 
of response, they received to their speaking up. Nurses felt they spent a lot of time “chasing 
their tail” to get someone to listen to their concerns, and also time having to “go back several 
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times” to get what they needed (Nurse I and Nurse J). They were also frustrated by the 
perceived lack of interest in their concerns among providers and management. Nurses felt if 
they were taking the time and energy to bring a safety concern to someone, that person 
should take their concern seriously and respond appropriately. When they didn’t, feelings of 
frustration, disrespect, and unimportance were expressed. “Some of the time they think I 
don’t know anything” (Nurse D). “Am I really an important member of the team?” (Nurse 
E). These nurses spent large amounts of time at the bedside, and in their role felt they 
developed a clear understanding of what was needed to keep the patients safe and to give the 
best care. When their input into that care was disregarded frustration resulted, especially if 
they felt their patient “got screwed” as a result (Nurse H). 
Fears about speaking up were frequently related to the fear of being wrong, that “I 
could have a suggestion, and then they would take it and be wrong” (Nurse D). This fear was 
based in fear of harming the patient and fear of harming their own reputation as a nurse. 
Nursing judgement was questioned automatically by providers, so the stakes were high to get 
every call correct. This made speaking up a risk for nurses even though it was a key part of 
their professional role. If they were wrong, their reputation could be damaged, giving 
providers more reasons to doubt their nursing judgement. These events would make 
advocating in the future more difficult. Therefore, the decision to speak up required weighing 
the risk to the patient against the risk to the nurse. 
 Successful speaking up and feeling supported in their speaking up led to positive 
emotions, mostly increased confidence and happiness. Increased confidence was expressed 
when speaking up went well, not just in relation to speaking up but also in their assessment 
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skills and nursing judgement. Positive responses “build confidence” and makes the nurse 
“feel more a part of the team” (Nurse I). 
 Happiness was the other positive emotion primarily expressed, and it came mostly 
from feeling the patient was well cared for and safe. It also came from the satisfaction of “I 
feel like I did my job today,” as successful speaking up or advocacy was seen as key to being 
an effective nurse (Nurse H). These positive emotions also helped encourage future speaking 
up, as it reinforced the importance and impact their advocacy could have on the patients’ 
outcomes, along with the satisfaction of doing their job well. 
External Influences on Speaking up Behaviors 
I lean on the fact that I can go to my charge nurse or assistant manager, they do a lot 
to help us out. (Nurse J) 
 
 Although nurses expressed a commitment to speaking up for their patients in all 
situations they perceived to be dangerous to the patient, there were external factors that 
impacted both their willingness to speak up and how they went about it. The four factors that 
had the most impact were management culture, hierarchy, policies & protocols, and tools. 
These factors did not seem to change whether or not they spoke up, but how they spoke up 
and at times, to whom they spoke up. 
Management culture, defined here as how the nursing management perceived and 
supported speaking up, was a major influence on speaking up behaviors. Nurses expressed 
increased comfort and confidence in speaking up if they felt they had management who 
would support them. Nurse J talked about going to her charge nurse or assistant manager 
with a concern before contacting a provider, and how when they supported her decision and 
judgement that she needs to speak up, “then I'm more confident to go to the doctor or 
whoever to ask for what I want.” This step was viewed as a important support when they had 
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fears and/or doubts about what they wanted to bring to the provider. Nurses also expressed 
more comfort and confidence in speaking up when it was something they were “really 
encouraged to do by our management,” which was the case for multiple nurses (Nurse I). 
When nurses felt management culture was not supportive, or even discouraged 
speaking up, they expressed less comfort and confidence and more frustration and fears. This 
was especially true for nurses who felt their management actively discouraged speaking up, 
whether overtly, like firing someone who spoke up, or more subtly, like just not responding 
to concerns. These types of management culture were found to be unhealthy, and nurses 
talked about wanting to leave or having left those units. 
Hierarchy could be a positive or a negative. If the hierarchy supported the unit nurses 
and helped to back them up when they spoke up to the provider hierarchy, then it was seen as 
a strong positive to the nurses. Going to the charge nurse to “page the upper,” was a tactic 
used by multiple nurses (Nurse E). The upper was a term used to describe those providers 
above the intern, who was often mentioned as being unwilling to page their upper 
themselves. Those that worked as charge nurses felt it was sometimes their responsibility to 
“take things over and get things going,” and to “empower” the other nurses to speak up 
(Nurse C). Nurses went to the charge nurses as they were nurses who’s experience and 
leadership position gave their speaking up greater weight; their nursing judgement was less 
likely to be questioned by the providers and their speaking up was more successful. 
Hierarchy also impacted speaking up behaviors in terms of who they were speaking 
up to. Even charge nurses admitted they “would not feel comfortable” speaking up to 
attending physicians about some issues, especially issues around disruptive behavior and 
communication (Nurse B). Attending physicians, those who have completed all of their 
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training and supervise the interns and residents, are viewed as the top of the provider 
hierarchy and were clearly the most intimidating providers with whom to raise concerns. 
Attending physicians were seen as having the greatest knowledge and experience, and this 
added to the power gradient felt between staff nurse and provider. Interns, the lowest position 
in the provider hierarchy, were viewed more as equals by nurses than physicians higher up in 
the hierarchy (residents, chief residents, and fellows). This meant the nurses were 
comfortable contacting the intern, and it also meant that they were comfortable going above 
them if they did not agree with their judgement. However, nurses viewed the attending 
physician’s decision as final. “If I’ve gone through the intern, the chief and then the 
attending, and the attending is telling me, X, Y, Z, I just say, ‘Okay’” (Nurse B). At that 
point the outcome for the patient was “their responsibility” (Nurse D). The nurses did express 
they felt the attending physicians almost always made the right call, so further speaking up 
was judged to be unnecessary. 
Policies and protocols impacted speaking up as they were used as support for nursing 
judgement, and as a reason to say no to a provider. This was not universal, as if the providers 
requested something that was against policy that the nurse felt would not harm the patient, 
such as an additional lab test discussed by Nurse F, they would follow the order. But if 
speaking up was viewed as a danger to the patient and they had a policy or protocol backing 
them up, nurses were willing to challenge the providers, and did so in multiple situations they 
shared in the interviews. Nurse F described a situation where the providers wanted her to 
both change the frequency of a lab draw and increase a medication dose faster than the 
protocol allowed. “The team had told me, well not the team the doctor had told me, well why 
don’t you adjust it by two instead, and I was like no, I’m not going to do that” (Nurse F). 
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Having a written policy in front of her allowed Nurse F to stand her ground and refuse an 
order she felt was unsafe for her patient, while still offering the providers a concrete reason 
for doing so. 
Educational intervention tools, those that are taught as a class for speaking up, in this 
case CUS, TeamSTEPPS, and SBI were mentioned as having been taught, but no nurse 
actually described using these. The CUS tool was mentioned, but it was not described in the 
usual I’m Concerned, I’m Uncomfortable, this is a Safety issue manner by all (CUS Tool, 
May 2017). One nurse described it as “like a concern and then your reasoning and suggest a 
solution” (Nurse H), while another described it as “uncomfortable, this doesn’t feel safe” 
(Nurse I). TeamSTEPPS was mentioned as having be taught by one nurse, but she did not 
feel it was being used at all. SBI was described as “a way to communicate person-to-person, 
especially if you're frustrated, if a nurse mistreated you” and as “Situation, background, and 
intervention” (Nurse E). Though nurses felt they could use these tools, they did not share any 
experiences where they had used them. 
Two non-education tools were discussed, rapid response teams and multidisciplinary 
rounds. Multidisciplinary rounds were not viewed as effective for nurses to speak up. Nurses 
described them as “the biggest waste of time ever” and felt their input was not valued by the 
other participants (Nurse E). They were also stated that rounds took the nurse away from the 
bedside at critical times in the AM when nurses had a great deal of work to accomplish. 
Although the other tools mentioned were not seen as effective, Rapid Response Teams 
(RRTs) were viewed as a very positive and effective tool, for both the patients and to help 
nurses speak up. 
The rapid response team, they are always encouraging like the nurses to like call them 
because they are very good in between person to speak with the doctors, and kinda of 
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like give them some recommendations and stuff like that. I feel very encouraged to 
speak up for whatever it might be. (Nurse C) 
 
Nurses felt they could call the RRT whenever they needed to and the team would take 
their concerns seriously. They also felt the providers accepted the RRT judgement more 
readily, as Nurse C described above. This often led to faster interventions for the patient the 
nurses felt were needed. Another response team, the Behavior Response Team, was 
described as less helpful, as the nurses felt the Behavior team did not take their concerns 
seriously and therefore were unwilling to help with the situation. But the nurses made it clear 
the RRT was viewed as a valuable tool for speaking up and to keep the patients safe. 
All of these factors impacted the nurses’ experiences with speaking up, and their 
confidence and willingness to continue to raise concerns. Those nurses who reported 
perceptions that they were that increased feelings of being encouraged to speak up were 
positive management culture, supportive hierarchy, policies and protocols, and RRTs. 
Negative or dismissive management culture, steeper hierarchy, and ineffective tools had a 
negative or no impact on speaking up behaviors. 
Defining Speaking Up for Patient Safety 
 At each interview, the nurses were asked to share how they defined speaking up for 
patient safety. Each nurse gave a definition, from a few words to almost a paragraph (Table 
11). These definitions all required the nurse to bring the patient to someone who could 
address it, but they did not all include making suggestions or require action to be done as part 
of speaking up. Only some nurses indicated this was required of speaking up, others 
indicated identifying the problem and bring it to the attention of a provider was enough to 
define speaking up. When they described their experiences with the phenomenon of speaking 
up, the outcome for the patient and for the nurse was clearly important. Speaking up was 
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done with a purpose and an outcome in mind, from bringing the provider to the bedside to 
getting the patient moved to a higher level of care. These definitions and those pulled from 
the Chapter 2 literature review will be analyzed in Chapter 5. 
Table 11 
Definitions from Interviews 
It’s means going, almost challenging what their plan 
is or making a suggestion that differs from their plan 
of care to something that may suit the patient better 
when you speak and you have a concern about the 
patient and don’t get your needs addressed in a 
timely manner, having to try to reach out to the 
provider again to try to get your needs addressed. 
(Nurse D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Well, what I feel like is that if you have—this should 
be more objective, but just be like, I see this is a 
problem. These would be my suggestions, describe 
the problem, what your suggestions would be, and 
then on management side, they say, “Okay. Name, 
received your suggestions. Thank you very much. 
Appreciate your concern, we’d be looking into it.” 
Then they on their part decide what they can, they 
can’t, and then they get back with you, and say, 
“Well, we—I’ve checked with so and so who would 
be able to address that problem, and at this time we 
feel like, this is—and then they gave the answer to 
that. That to me is a healthy communication closed 
loop, because I get to tell them, I get suggestions, 
they give me back, I followed up on it. It was 
addressed, and this is where we’re going to be at 
least right now where we are with our budget, and 
what we can do, that’s like being with a healthy 
close loop. And no one is talking about—no one is 
negative in it, no one’s—it’s—and so then that 
would just like a free-flowing communication 
system. (Nurse A) 
So speaking up is having the confidence to speak up, 
relay the information in accurate manner, and I guess 
present the issue at hand and what we want to have 
done. (Nurse E) 
 
 
 
 
 
It means that if something is going on with your 
patient, be it assessment, be it localization of the 
patient or whatever else, and something is out of the 
ordinary or different, then you need to alert 
somebody of that, and do some interventions. 
Especially if it’s going to be harmful or something 
serious that could end up hurting the patient, or have 
them decline, go into sepsis or whatever it may be. 
(Nurse B) 
you get an order for something and you don’t think 
it’s right or doesn’t apply to that patient or maybe 
there is an error or just anything using like nursing 
judgement to question orders and then putting that up 
to the practitioner . . . questioning anything that 
doesn’t seem right. (Nurse F) 
maybe, maybe challenging the doctors. (Nurse C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
Table 11 
Cont. 
you are concerned about something and you express 
why you are concerned and you like say a solution, 
or ask the doctor something, and they have a 
different solution, or you just address, you talk to the 
doctor, you send them the page like, please call back 
about XYZ. (Nurse H) 
 
When you see something that is endangering the 
patient or in any way putting them in harm’s risk; 
that you would be willing to speak up either to the 
patient, to the family, to the team or to like your 
fellow co-workers about what’s going on and then 
how it’s putting the patient at risk of harm and how 
we could go about fixing the problem. (Nurse G) 
To me, it makes me think of like, the CUS words. 
Uncomfortable, this doesn’t feel safe,  
my role as an advocate for the patient 
if something makes me uncomfortable that it’s my 
responsibility to communicate that to the physician. 
(Nurse I) 
 
 
just means like advocating for my patients. Like 
advocating and making sure that they get like I said, 
the best they can, they get what that they need. 
Sometimes it’s very literal because like I said my 
patients can’t always talk for themselves. So it can 
be very literal in my head but just speak out for 
them, to speak for them, to say what they need. 
(Nurse J) 
 
Conclusions 
 When I undertook this project, I attempted to bracket my personal experiences with 
speaking up by examining and identifying my own beliefs about this phenomenon, a 
technique discussed in Chapter 4. I could only think of a few examples from my ten-year 
career as a hospital unit nurse. For example, I had to call a physician over a dangerous 
medication order when I worked pediatrics; another time I paged for a provider to come to 
the bedside as my patient was actively seizing. I had a narrower view of speaking up for 
patient safety than the nurses I interviewed presented, as the situations they described had 
certainly occurred during my hospital career as well. I also considered speaking up to always 
be a challenge, disagreeing with the physician. But nurses expressed speaking up as 
sometimes a challenge, sometimes just getting information to someone who needed it. The 
descriptions that emerged—that nurses must speak up, that it is so important to their 
professional identity that if they felt they could not do they should leave their unit or nursing 
altogether—raises important questions about how we approach interventions to encourage 
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speaking up for patient safety. These nurses described that they were speaking up and that 
they understood the critical nature of doing so. But if nurses are already raising concerns, is 
the issue we need to address increasing speaking up or increasing listening? 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Speaking up for patient safety is clearly a concept of interest in health care and was 
viewed as a positive behavior throughout the literature and by the participants in this study. 
However, speaking up means different things to different people, and the lack of clarity about 
its meaning makes it difficult to create and implement effective interventions to promote it. 
Additionally, the research and discussion around speaking up to date has been one-sided, 
examining the speaker but not the intended audience, placing all the responsibility on the 
individual speaking up. In this conclusion, I will offer a definition for speaking up for patient 
safety and discuss how we need to expand the language of speaking up beyond that singular 
phrase. I will also examine what the data we have indicates about speaking up, the current 
tools we have available for speaking up and the measurement of speaking up behaviors. I will 
also discuss factors that need to be considered before further intervention studies are 
undertaken, the implications for practice and research, and limitations of this work. 
Defining Speaking Up for Patient Safety 
 Twenty-five definitions of speaking up and related terms were extracted from the 
literature, and ten definitions were provided by study participants (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 10). 
There were two common themes; raising concerns about patient safety and bringing it to the 
attention of someone with the power to intervene. Other aspects, such as when and how, 
varied between definitions. Whether or not speaking up ended at the speech act itself or 
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required actual action beyond speech also varied between definitions. Is it fair to say 
speaking up did not occur if action did not result from it? As multiple authors have 
categorized unsuccessful speaking up speech acts as silence, it does indicate some sources 
believe that speaking up only occurs in the presence of action (Maxfield et al., 2010; Sayre et 
al., 2012b). But to define speaking up this way is an oversimplification. Speaking up is a type 
of communication, and, as such, it is not solely within the power of the person speaking as to 
how successful the communication can be. Communication requires both a sender (speaker) 
and a receiver (listener) to be successful (Dayton & Henriksen, 2007). If the sender is 
completely silent, they can be held responsible for the failure of communication. But if the 
sender does speak up, the listener is now part of the communication, and must be taken into 
account when evaluating the success or failure of that communication. A lack of action is not 
the same as a lack of speech, and that distinction needs to be made clear in the language 
around speaking up. Holding the speaker solely responsible for the communication implies 
speaking up is an individual behavior—something that does not require anyone else to 
determine the outcome. This is appropriate if speaking up is defined to just include the 
speech act, whether the professional spoke up at all or remained silent. But forms of speaking 
up that are done to get input and possibly action from someone else should not be viewed as 
an individual act. 
 The broad definition of the term “speaking up” is also problematic. Two hundred and 
twenty-one synonyms were found for speaking up in the literature review; the top 15 most 
frequently used are shown in Appendix A. Authors used everything from whistleblowing to 
the media to conversations in the operating room as synonymous with speaking up, and the 
nurses interviewed in this study described speaking up in a variety of ways. These included 
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situations such as disagreeing with a medication order to discussing computer issues with 
management (Barzallo-Salazar et al., 2014; Kelly & Jones, 2013). All these types of speaking 
up have value, and there are good arguments that all of them contribute to patient safety. 
However, the definitions vary and need to be defined and conceptualized more discretely. 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to identify and offer definitions for all types 
of speaking up behaviors in health care. That will require future research into what 
distinguishes one type from another and how best to define and conceptualize them. But a 
definition for speaking up for patient safety in its broad form is possible based on the 
definitions pulled from the literature and those offered by study participants. Adapted from 
Law and Chan (2015), which they attribute to Sayre et al. (2012b), I define speaking up for 
patient safety as A healthcare professional identifying a concern that might impact patient 
safety and using his or her voice to raise the concern to someone with the power to address 
it. This definition does not require a recommendation or action for speaking up, and therefore 
is an individual action solely in the control of the speaker. However, the type of speaking up 
that requires action, along with other speech acts like whistleblowing to an external agency, 
are types of speaking up, and the expansiveness of this definition allows them to be included. 
 Speaking up for patient safety is an important behavior and should be encouraged for 
all healthcare providers (Blanco et al., 2009). But forms of speaking up that require action to 
be successful, where the provider is challenging the decisions of another provider and 
advocating to change the plan and outcome for a patient, go beyond speaking up and should 
be classified separately. To differentiate the types of speaking up it could be helpful to look 
outside of health care, possibly to areas of study like organizational communication, which 
“focuses on the role of messages, media, meaning, and symbolic activity in constituting and 
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shaping organizational processes” (Putnam, Woo, & Banghart, 2017, paragraph 1). Although 
work needs to be done to move concepts from organizational communication into health 
care, the research done into concepts like employee voice and organizational dissent could be 
helpful in establishing clear definitions for speaking up behaviors. Parallels can be drawn 
between speaking up for patient safety and employee voice, defined as “actively and 
constructively trying to improve conditions through discussing problems with a supervisor or 
coworkers, taking action to solve problems, suggesting solutions, seeking help from an 
outside agency like a union or whistle-blowing” (Kassing, 2011, p. 32). Like the broad 
definition of speaking up presented above, employee voice includes other speaking up 
behaviors, like whistleblowing, “the disclosure by organization members (former and 
current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525. 
Organizational dissent, “expressing disagreement or contradictory opinions about 
organizational practices, policies and operations” could be useful in defining speaking up for 
patient safety that requires challenging others’ decisions and attempting to change the plan of 
care for the patient (Kassing, 2011, p. 32; attributed to Kassing, 1998, p. 183). 
 Bringing the concept of dissent into healthcare is critical if we want to empower 
health care professionals to actually challenge each other when they believe the patient’s 
well-being is at risk. Nurses are taught to speak up for and protect their patients from harm; 
they consider it a key aspect of their professional role (Lyndon, 2008; Sundqvist & Carlsson, 
2013; Szymczak, 2016). But in the current health care environment, nurses express 
frustration with how difficult it is challenge providers for what they feel their patients need, 
to the point some have indicated they stopped trying (Lyndon et al., 2012). What is needed to 
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improve patient safety is the acceptance of the idea that all members of the team should be 
able to express disagreement, and other members need to listen and take their concerns 
seriously. 
What is Known 
 Nurses speak up. Although some studies indicate a minority of nurses (12% and 34%; 
Lyndon et al., 2012; Black, 2011, respectively) do not speak up when they see serious safety 
issues, all studies find the majority of nurses do speak up to protect their patients (Black, 
2011; Lyndon et al., 2012; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014; Sundqvist & Carlsson, 2013; 
Szymczak, 2016). But we also know that speaking up is often unsuccessful; nurses described 
that they did not get the action or change they were looking for and frequently felt others 
were not interested in what they have to say (Black, 2011; Garon, 2012; Lyndon et al., 2014). 
Nurses define patient safety issues quite broadly, from staffing to errors in medication orders 
(Garon, 2012; Szymczak, 2016). Speaking up is often viewed as an individual act, with all 
the responsibility for success or failure placed on the speaker (Maxfield et al., 2011). Silence 
and unsuccessful speaking up are viewed by some as the same issue, which contributes to a 
lack of clarity in both defining and operationalizing speaking up (Maxfield et al., 2011; Sayre 
et al., 2012). Nurses view their primary role to be “there for my patients and to do whatever it 
is that’s best for them to make sure they get what they need” (Nurse J). Speaking up that is 
successful and well received empowers nurses to keep speaking up and increases their 
confidence in their knowledge and nursing judgement (Aydon, Hauck, Zimmer, & Murdoch, 
2016; Garon, 2012). Speaking up that is poorly received or unsuccessful has the opposite 
effect and increases fears and frustrations around speaking up (Garon, 2012; Schwappach & 
Gehring, 2014). More knowledge and experience increase willingness to speak up, with new 
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nurses and students expressing a great deal of discomfort with speaking up (Aydon et al., 
2016; Lyndon et al., 2012). 
There are multiple studies presenting robust data as to how nurses perceive speaking 
up, including the facilitators and barriers as described above (Aydon et al., 2016; Black, 
2011; Garon, 2012; Lyndon et al., 2012; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014; Szymczak, 2016). 
These data can provide a good basis to examine what interventions and further research is 
needed to increase speaking up behaviors in health care. 
Clinical Tools for Speaking Up 
 A few clinical tools for speaking up were discussed in the literature review, and one 
was used for the study, but they all showed mixed results at best, and were mostly used as 
part of a larger safety program (Table 7). The main clinical tool mentioned as being taught in 
both the literature review articles and the study, CUS (Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety 
Issue), did not appear to be actually used in practice (CUS Tool, May 2017). As have I 
discussed in previous Chapters, the literature review and study found no evidence that 
supported its effectiveness in promoting speaking up. CUS also puts all of the responsibility 
on the speaker, as there are no instructions or requirements for the listener at all (CUS Tool, 
May 2017). The Two-Challenge Rule, which is adapted from aviation’s Crew Resource 
Management (CRM), was found to be effective to increase residents speaking up in 
simulations (Pian-Smith et al., 2009), but was found to be ineffective for increasing speaking 
up behaviors with anesthesiologists in simulations by Raemer et al. (2016). The Two-
Challenge Rule has advantages over CUS in that it is simple, (repeat your concern twice), 
direct (to the person your concern is with) and requires an outcome to be reached after those 
two challenges that satisfies the challenger or involving a third party, requiring the listener to 
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address the speaker’s concerns before moving forward with care (Pian-Smith et al., 2009). 
More research is needed on clinical tools to increase speaking up behaviors, as no tool was 
found in this review have more than mixed effectiveness, nor were there any studies found 
that looked at these tools as a standalone intervention in real clinical situations. 
Measurements of Speaking Up 
 The main instrument used to evaluate speaking up behaviors (Communication 
Openness subscale) was the Hospital Survey of Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC). The low 
Cronbach ’s reported for the Communication Openness composite indicate a lack of 
reliability (Table 8). The lack of clarity around meaning and usage of the term speaking up 
could account for at least some of the reliability issue. It is also important to note that this 
scale only evaluates one side of communication openness, as there are no items that ask 
about the listener or receiver receptiveness. Adding items to the scale that ask questions like 
“Those in positions of greater authority listen and respond appropriately when I speak up,” or 
“Everyone’s input is listened to and valued on our unit when it comes to patient safety” could 
help give a more thorough measurement of communication openness. As current constructed, 
results from the HSOPSC Communication Openness composite should be interpreted 
cautiously, especially if the scale is translated or altered in anyway (Table 8). 
Implications for Practice and Future Research 
 There are significant data on exploring speaking up from the speaker’s viewpoint; 
there are limited data on speaking up communications from the receiver’s viewpoint. The 
articles and studies found in the literature review were overwhelmingly focused on the 
speaker; the importance of them speaking up, examining how they spoke up, feelings and 
issues around their speaking up, and suggestions to make their speaking up more successful 
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(Appendix A). Only two articles looked at speaking up in relation to the listener or intended 
audience. One asked speakers about how they perceived their speaking up was received 
(Lyndon et al., 2014), and the other article was the Barzallo-Salzar et al. (2014) study of the 
impact of surgeon encouragement of speaking up behaviors on medical students speaking up 
when they saw an error in simulated surgery. That study had the most significant results of 
the intervention studies, as medical students spoke up over twice as much in the encouraged 
group (82%) versus the discouraged group (30%) (Barzallo-Salzar et al., 2014). 
 The fact that the most effective intervention to increase speaking up behaviors was 
not aimed at the speaker at all indicates that past interventions may have been aimed at the 
wrong part of the communication or failed to identify that speaking up is not always an 
individual act. Multiple studies, including the one presented in chapter 4, found that nurses 
speak up for patient safety (Lyndon et al., 2012; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014). Multiple 
studies have also found that nurses report difficulty with getting their intended audience to 
listen and respond to their concerns (Black, 2011; Garon, 2012; Lyndon et al., 2014). Going 
forward it will be important to explore the reasons for these issues if interventions are to be 
effective in increasing speaking up that leads to better outcomes for patients. 
 One issue that should be examined is why nurses report so much difficulty with 
contacting providers (Lyndon et al., 2014). Is this an issue with the way we are 
communicating (e.g., paging systems), or is it more an issue with the responsiveness of the 
audience? If the issue is with the providers, what is causing it? The other issue that needs to 
be examined from the provider view is how seriously they take nurses’ concerns. Many 
nurses in both the literature reviewed and the interviews felt that physicians doubted their 
nursing judgement and therefore did not take their concerns seriously (Lyndon et al., 2014; 
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Szymczak, 2016). Studies that have examined teamwork and communication have found that 
the way physicians view good teamwork with nurses is discrepant from the way nurses view 
it. Makary et al. (2006) reported that nurses described good teamwork as “having their input 
respected,” while physicians described good collaboration as “having nurses who anticipate 
their needs and follow instructions” (p. 748). Understanding the expectations and 
assumptions of the receiver of the speaking up is critical to designing effective interventions. 
Qualitative or survey studies with providers about how they respond to speaking up attempts 
could be extremely informative in terms of the issues they encounter that interfere with 
communication. 
 Future research also needs to examine management issues with speaking up, as nurses 
report unresponsive management as often as they report unresponsive physicians. Some 
patient safety issues nurses encounter, such as inadequate staffing, have to be taken to 
management if nurses want to see change, but both the literature and interviews indicate 
nurses often feel management is uninterested and unresponsive to their concerns (Garon, 
2012). This needs to be examined from the receiver side as well. If hospital administrations 
are ignoring patient safety issues that is an issue that needs to be brought to light and 
addressed, or it may just be that management needs to communicate better overall with unit 
nurses. But with many nurses currently reporting they feel it is pointless to speak up to 
management as “nothing ever changes,” more research is needed in this area (Black, 2011; 
Morrow et al., 2016).  
Limitations 
 One of the goals of the study done was to look at nurses’ views on speaking up from 
units with reported high and low levels of communication openness, to both get a 
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heterogeneous sample, and to see if differences emerged among those populations. However, 
no participants were employed on the units with higher reported communication openness 
levels, so this comparison was not possible. Recruitment began and continued throughout the 
study on the highest rated units, but no nurses volunteered to participate from these units. A 
larger study that includes nurses from units with high levels of communication openness 
could help identify differences in the environment and speaking up behaviors among those 
that view their speaking up as successful or not. A change in recruitment techniques may 
have led to an increase in sample size as well; it is possible more in-person appeals or 
offering the nurses a chance to submit their experiences in writing instead of through an 
interview could have increased participation. The small sample size also prevented me from 
identifying more specifically the units’ communication openness levels, as I do believe it 
would have made it too easy to identify study participants if this information were included. 
A larger study, across multiple hospitals, could help increase our understanding of the issues 
around speaking up without endangering participant anonymity.  
 The use of the search term “patient safety” in all searches could have impacted the 
articles returned, especially in light of the broad use of the term speaking up that was found 
in the study and literature review. The goal was to examine speaking up in light of a 
perceived immediate threat to patient safety that needed to be addressed, but the study 
brought to light that many nurses perceive immediate threats to patient safety to include a 
patient’s need for more supervision or care and staffing issues. This further points out the 
need for more discrete definitions and language around speaking up, as it is possible articles 
were not included that could have been due to the use of “patient safety” in the search. 
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 It is clear more research is needed to better define and distinguish speaking up 
behaviors, along with work to increase our understanding of listening and speaking up. The 
one-sided nature of research to date calls into question the idea that we need more speaking 
up, especially in light of all the studies indicating the majority nurses are speaking up (Black, 
2011; Lyndon et al., 2012; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014; Sundqvist & Carlsson, 2013; 
Szymczak, 2016). It is possible that the real issue with speaking up for patient safety lies with 
the listener and how they respond to the concerns raised. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
FIFTEEN MOST FREQUENTLY USED SYNONYMS FOR SPEAKING UP 
 
 
  
15 Most Frequently Used Synonyms for Speaking Up 
 
Synonym Frequency 
Speak Up 118 
Raise Concern 59 
Whistleblower 52 
Report 45 
Question 43 
Voice Concern 42 
Advocate 37 
Express Concern 36 
Speak Out 34 
Ask Question 30 
Challenge 28 
Report Concern 26 
Voice 25 
Communication Openness 19 
Complain 14 
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APPENDIX B 
 
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY 
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APPENDIX C 
 
FLYER 
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APPENDIX D 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
Interview Guide—Speaking Up Study 
 
Consent process, recording device on. 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. I will be asking you about any experiences you 
have had with speaking up for your patients’ safety, including talking about the reasons and 
emotions around the experience. Remember your participation is completely voluntary and 
you can refuse to answer any question and stop the interview at any time. All identifying 
information will be removed from your answers when the audio is transcribed, including 
names, units, dates, and diagnoses. Once transcriptions are done and checked the audio 
recordings will be deleted. 
 
1. What have you experienced in terms of speaking up for patient safety? 
 
2. What context or situations have typically influenced or affected your experiences 
with speaking up for patient safety? 
 
Other open-ended questions can be added based on the participant’s response, these two are 
the primary focus of this type of phenomenology study. 
 
Probable additional questions include:  
 
3. How would you define speaking up in relation to patient safety? 
4. What were your concerns or fears about speaking up? 
5. What motivates you to speak up for your patients? 
6. What influences you to remain silent? 
7. How was your speaking up received by those around you? 
8. What else would you like me to know about your experience(s) with speaking up? 
9. What were the repercussions from speaking up? (If any)  
Additional possible follow ups include: 
 
10. When this experience occurred, what was going on around you? 
11. What was the outcome for your patient from this experience? 
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12. What are your emotions as you talk about the event?  
13. You stated you knew no one would listen to you anyway. How did you know no 
one would listen?  
14. You stated you felt like you were ignored/listened to/valued/ridiculed. How did 
that make you feel? 
15. How has the experience influenced your willingness to speak up for your patients 
now?  
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